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Introduction  
Banks have long provided essential services to the economy and to Canadians. In return, they 
have had access to special privileges, and been subject to special prohibitions. Across the world, 
there are boundaries around what we in Canada would call the “business of banking”. Such 
boundaries are important, because they set the conditions under which institutions may be 
recognized as “banks,” and may have access to those privileges and prohibitions. This report 
summarizes research undertaken across five jurisdictions – Australia, Japan, Singapore, the 
United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US, federal level only) – with respect to a 
particular kind of boundary on the business of banking: the separation of banking business from 
commercial business. “Commercial” here means the provision of non-financial goods and 
services. This separation exists under what in the United States has long been referred to as the 
“banking/commercial separation doctrine”. 
The banking/commercial separation doctrine operates against a backdrop of other boundaries, 
notably including bank licensing regimes.1 Only institutions with banking licenses or equivalent 
state permission may carry out the core businesses of banking at all; i.e., only they may take 
deposits or other repayable funds from the public, which are payable on demand, and readily 
transferable to third parties on the depositor’s instruction.2 The fact that banks take deposits and 
provide transaction accounts, thereby providing individuals and the economy with a liquid, 
mobile, accepted medium for the movement of capital, is what historically has distinguished 
them from other financial institutions, and has made them so important to the economy. Deposit-
taking in particular is sometimes identified as the core characteristic of banking.3 
Against this backdrop, the business of banking has changed radically over the past 30 years. 
Because of technology, in many jurisdictions, some of the core banking functions that made 
banks “special,” and that made them central to proper functioning of the economy and the capital 
markets, can now be provided by non-bank entities as well, through new products and new 
services. Banks’ own services and products are also evolving. Importantly, even where the 
                                               
1 I use the generic term “license” to refer to the concept of a license that banks must obtain in order to operate as 
banks. In practice, the terminology varies; for example, in the United States, banks receive “charters” rather than 
“licenses.” The word “bank” is also used generically here, to refer to institutions by whatever name (e.g., “credit 
institutions,” in the EU) that may carry out the core banking businesses: taking deposits or other repayable funds 
from the public, and issuing loans.  
2 The language of “taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public” is drawn from Directive 2013/36/EU, 
at Article 9, though similar language exists elsewhere. Note that payment systems, such as PayPal or Apple Pay, are 
not in fact engaging in this activity and are not “banks.” EC, Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC, [2013] OJ, L 176/338. 
3 See E. Gerald Corrigan, “Annual Report 1982: Are Banks Special?” (1 January 1983), online: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis <https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/ar/annual-report-1982-
complete-text> at para 8. For more on the theoretical foundations of banking, including the maturity and liquidity 
mismatches that characterize the banking business, see, e.g., John Armour et al, Principles of Financial Regulation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 275-89.  
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banking/commercial separation doctrine is in place, banks are already able to engage in a fairly 
wide range of financial (as opposed to non-financial, commercial) business. Existing regulatory 
provisions allow for “ancillary” business lines, or business lines that are “closely related” to 
banking. The step from banks’ existing practices to entering into genuinely commercial, non-
financial work is meaningful, but it is an extension of existing business rather than something of 
an entirely different order.  
Regulation has been evolving in response to change in the industry, as well as in response to 
lessons learned in the recent financial crisis about banks’ exposure to broader market risks 
(including risks being run within their own corporate groups), and about the nature and sources 
of systemic fragility and risk. Prudential regulation to safeguard against systemic risk, in 
particular, has become a powerful tool. Relative to those sophisticated tools and in light of 
contemporary technology (for communications, for effecting financial transactions, and for 
deploying data), the traditional banking/separation doctrine now seems like a somewhat 
arbitrary, anachronistic, and blunt tool. 
Three of the five jurisdictions reviewed here, notably the United States (US) and, following it, 
Japan and Singapore, have a specific provision embedded within their licensing regimes that 
would prohibit banks, as defined above, from engaging in commercial, that is non-financial, 
business. The banking/commercial separation doctrine is not part of the regulatory regimes in the 
United Kingdom (UK) or Australia, where financial regulation is based on a “twin peaks” model. 
Of the three jurisdictions that do impose a banking/commercial separation doctrine, none has 
eliminated it entirely. However, the distinction is being relaxed in Japan and Singapore. In the 
US, the doctrine is arguably at risk of being circumvented altogether by new fintech companies, 
in part because other (state-level) regulatory licensing options, which do not apply the separation 
doctrine, exist.  
Yet the concerns that produced the banking/commercial separation doctrine are as real as ever. It 
remains important to protect against risks that flow from the business of banking: notably 
mitigating systemic risk, protecting state deposit insurers from over-commitment, and 
maintaining a functioning market for financial services (by ensuring fair competition, eliminating 
potential conflicts of interest, and addressing market concentration concerns). Based on a review 
of the jurisdictions studied here, however, it may be that these concerns can be better met 
through other regulatory requirements than through the banking/commercial distinction. The 
prospect of banks engaging in commercial work may no longer be the most important concern. 
The concerns that such activity raises can be addressed better by focusing explicitly on the 
regulatory concerns themselves – mitigating systemic risk and protecting consumers – rather 
than attempting to regulate through the imperfect proxy of the banking/commercial separation 
doctrine.  
In the UK, in spite of the lack of an explicit banking/commercial separation doctrine, banks 
apparently nevertheless refrain from engaging in non-financial commercial activity. The primary 
mechanism that has limited that engagement has been prudential regulation. Reportedly, UK 
banks to date have interpreted the prudential regulatory requirements that apply to them to 
conclude that engaging in non-financial commercial business lines would not be profitable. 
(Ring-fencing may change this but it also changes the scope of the “special” part of the banking 
business, as discussed below.) Note, however, that banks in Australia seem to have interpreted 
very similar regulatory provisions in a way that allows them to branch out into such business 
lines. Australian regulatory standards have not provided guidance or clarity on the 
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appropriateness of this interpretation, and they have not responded in a fashion that would force 
banks to be transparent about the risks they are running in such business lines. Prudential 
regulation on its own will not work to limit the risks associated with banks engaging in 
commercial business, unless banks are required to be explicit and transparent about how they 
assess risk, and unless they are required to disclose and manage risks associated specifically 
with their non-financial commercial businesses as well as their banking and financial ones.  
This report and its appendices identify the following practices, adopted in some of the 
jurisdictions studied here, as relevant: 
• The banking/commercial separation doctrine exists in the US, Japan, and Singapore. In 
each of these jurisdictions, however, it is no longer an entirely “bright line” rule. For 
example, the definition of the “business of banking” in each of these jurisdictions has 
evolved to include a range of ancillary businesses, including both financial and (most 
explicitly in Singapore) certain permissible non-financial ones. Banks in these 
jurisdictions have also traditionally been prohibited from owning substantial investments 
in non-financial companies, but these limits are also being relaxed in both Japan and 
Singapore.  
• In the US, developments are somewhat distinct: because of its “dual” federal/state bank 
licensing regime, fintechs and other startups are able to do business, sometimes in 
cooperation with a state-licensed bank, without having to seek regulatory approval from 
the main federal regulator, the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and therefore without 
being subject to the banking/commercial separation doctrine at all. Regulatory 
competition has also caused the OCC to develop a controversial new “restricted” federal 
bank charter. A principled policy discussion about the continued need for the 
banking/commercial separation doctrine has not emerged in the US. 
• In the UK, where there is no banking/commercial separation doctrine but following Basel 
II and III and EU Law, prudential regulation that applies across a bank’s subsidiaries has 
been an important practical tool for managing systemic risk in the financial system. 
Techniques for assessing and managing an institution’s safety and soundness have 
developed significantly since the turn of the millennium. These days, when banking 
activities (and deposit-like and loan-like products) extend across financial regulatory 
sectors, sometimes producing massive systemic risk, it is not obvious why a bank’s 
potential commercial/retailing activities in particular should be singled out for 
opprobrium. At the same time, absent extenuating circumstances, all of a bank’s activities 
should be presumed to affect the bank’s safety and soundness, and the bank as a whole 
should be presumed to be benefiting from the special privileges that flow from licensing.  
• In addition, the United Kingdom has recently implemented regulatory “ring-fencing” of 
banks’ traditional consumer depository banking functions, to ensure that a bank’s 
commercial activities do not generate systemic risk, or undue pressure on state deposit 
insurance. Under ring-fencing, any commercial businesses that a bank might choose to 
run would almost certainly fall outside the “fence,” meaning outside the zone of special 
privileges and prudential regulation. 
• In Australia, the large banks now engage in a range of non-financial commercial activity, 
which they consider they are not required to disclose under existing prudential standards. 
New prudential standards, set to come into effect in January 2020, are somewhat more 
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comprehensive in transparency terms but still fall substantially short of what is 
recommended here. The new proposed standards, like the existing ones, still operate on a 
vision of a bank as a fundamentally financial institution. The changing nature of the 
banking business, in Australia and internationally, suggests that this limited vision will 
not capture the full range of businesses in which banks are engaging, in the near future.  
• Banks in general have access to enormous, high-quality data about their customers. Given 
the central importance of data to modern business models (financial and non-financial), 
this data is extremely valuable. Particularly in jurisdictions where the banking industry is 
already highly concentrated, allowing banks to extend into commercial businesses with 
the benefit of that data could produce concerns about competition. The objectives of 
ensuring competition, avoiding excessive market concentration, and minimizing the kinds 
of conflicts of interest that can choke off commercial competitors’ access to necessary 
funding have been addressed through Open Banking initiatives in several jurisdictions, 
including the UK, Australia, and soon Japan. Several jurisdictions – the US OCC, 
Australia, and the UK – have also taken steps to make it easier for fintechs to obtain 
either restricted, or full, banking licenses. 
• Just as important are some comparator jurisdictions’ efforts to protect customers’ rights, 
their data, and their privacy. For example, prohibiting anyone from selling customers’ 
data without the consumers’ consent, as Australia has begun to implement, would be a 
useful response that could apply comprehensively to any organization or individual. On a 
more limited scale, a customer data right that applied to financial institutions would 
address some customer protection and human dignity risks in this one sector.  
This report does not cover a number of potentially important developments around banking, 
“fintech”, and regulation, including:  
• payment systems, wholesale and retail, including e-commerce and cross-border 
remittances; 
• the traditional division between banking, investment and securities, and insurance; 
• “fintech” initiatives within the boundaries of financial businesses, including e.g., robo-
advising, e-trading, P2P lending (in the securities/investment banking space); insurtech; 
money in various forms including e-money and digital assets, and any initiatives relating 
to cryptocurrencies or distributed ledger technology; 
• state-level initiatives in the US; and, 
• the EU, except to the extent that EU Directives have been incorporated into UK domestic 
law. Note, however, that the EU has been at the forefront of the Open Banking and 
consumer data protection fields through the Revised Payment Services Directive.4 
The report begins by discussing bank licensing, which is an important background condition and 
which is distinct from the banking/commercial separation doctrine. 
                                               
4 “Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2)” (1 December 2017), online pdf: Temenos 
https://www.temenos.com/globalassets/mi/wp/16/temenos psd2 whitepaper v2.pdf. 
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Banking as “special” 
Banking licenses and the “business of banking” 
Banking is not like “regular” commercial business, or indeed quite like even the securities or the 
insurance businesses (being the other two broad categories of business under the traditional 
entity-based financial regulatory approach). Because of the central role that banks have 
traditionally played in the economy in offering transaction accounts for individuals and 
businesses, being the backup source of liquidity to all other institutions, and serving as a 
transmission belt for monetary policy, banks have long been considered to be “special.”5  
Banks have traditionally given individuals and businesses access to the payments system, and 
provided and created a liquid medium of exchange and savings for normal peoples’ “real 
economy” needs. The fact that they have performed these essential functions, in turn, has meant 
that banks have had access to extraordinary privileges, and have had additional regulatory 
obligations, relative to normal commercial enterprises. To support banks’ functioning, to avoid 
harmful bank runs, and to maintain stability in the banking sector, most modern economies have 
instituted deposit insurance.6 Banks facing liquidity problems also have access to short-term 
lending from their countries’ central banks or equivalent.7 In times of real crisis, banks may also 
have access to additional discretionary lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) funding and even bailouts, 
offered either through the open market or to specific banks. For all these reasons, banks can 
avoid consequences of illiquidity that normal commercial vendors cannot.  
In return, all the jurisdictions examined here have imposed some boundaries around the business 
of banking, specifically by instituting licensing regimes under which only sanctioned and 
recognized “banks” may engage in the core business of banking. Entity-based and “twin peaks” 
regulatory structures, discussed further below, differ in terms of how they slice up the regulatory 
task. However, they are the same in maintaining licensing regimes for banks, in view of the 
particular position that banks hold in the economy, in society, and within overarching economic 
                                               
5 This list of characteristics and the language of “specialness” comes from a famous speech by E. Gerald Corrigan, 
who at the time was President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, supra note 3. The discussion of bank 
“specialness” here is based on a traditional understanding of what functions banks provide within the economy – an 
approach that makes sense in the context of evaluating the traditional banking/commercial separation doctrine. The 
report should not be understood to be saying that traditional banking still functions precisely as it did in the middle 
of the twentieth century, for example (when the American Banking Holding Company Act was passed). On the 
contrary, banking and financial services generally have been transformed through technological and business 
process change. One of the most important recent analyses of the modern financial system, which directly 
challenges the notion that only banks should have access to deposit insurance, is Morgan Ricks, The Money 
Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). If accepted, Ricks’s 
argument likely only strengthens the case for saying that the traditional banking/commercial separation doctrine 
should no longer be a central pillar around which banking regulation is built. 
6 In the jurisdictions discussed here, they are as follows: in Australia, the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS); in Japan, 
the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan; in Singapore, the Singapore Deposit Insurance Corporation (SDIC); in 
the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS); in the United States, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Canada’s equivalent is the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC).  
7 Lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) functions can take different forms, of which the most familiar is the so-called 
“discount window.” In the jurisdictions discussed here, LOLRs are as follows: in Australia, the Reserve Bank of 
Australia; in Japan, the Bank of Japan; in Singapore, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS); in the United 
Kingdom, the Bank of England (which uses the term “liquidity insurance” rather than LOLR); in the United States, 
the Federal Reserve system. Canada’s equivalent is the Bank of Canada. 
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and fiscal architecture. A set of regulatory obligations and privileges, attendant on being a 
licensed bank, flow from the licensing. 
Banking licensing requirements incorporate two main elements: 
• a definition of “the business of banking,” the core of which comes down to the deposit-
taking function though depending on the regulatory structure it may include other things, 
including especially lending – the other side of a commercial bank’s traditional business 
model; and, 
• a requirement that anyone engaged in the business of banking must be licensed. The 
terms vary; e.g., in the United States, banks obtain “charters” and in the European Union, 
“credit institutions” receive what we would recognize as banking licenses. In a 
fragmented regime like the American one, several separate licensing applications (to, 
e.g., the OCC, the Federal Reserve system (the Fed), and the Federal Depository 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC)) – not to mention alternative state regulators – may be 
required. However, the basic existence of a licensing regime is common across 
jurisdictions. 
The relevant statutory provisions and licensing regimes are identified in Appendix 1. 
Licensing continues to be an essential mechanism for controlling access to the banking business. 
Yet, entry requirements have relaxed somewhat in some jurisdictions, reflecting the changes that 
technology and innovation have wrought.8 These are also described in Appendix 1, and 
Appendix 3. While not directly affecting the banking/commercial separation doctrine, the 
loosening of licensing requirements is relevant in that it, like the relaxation of the 
banking/commercial separation doctrine itself, reflects a general regulatory move away from 
heavy reliance on “bright-line” standards, toward a regime that is more sensitive to context and 
business realities, and that has access to more targeted and accurate strategies for achieving 
regulatory objectives. Licensing on its own is necessary, but not sufficient. With licensing in 
place and where other, meaningful safeguards and more appropriate regulatory mechanisms 
exist, the banking/commercial separation doctrine may in fact no longer be necessary. 
The banking/commercial separation doctrine in the United States 
For over a century, in addition to licensing provisions, American federal banking law9 has also 
generally prohibited banks from engaging in commercial activity. The reasons are important 
                                               
8 In the words of the United States Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in a press release, for example, a new 
restricted bank charter for fintech companies, launched by the OCC, “helps provide more choices to consumers and 
businesses, and creates greater opportunity for companies that want to provide banking services in America,” and “is 
consistent with bi-partisan government efforts at federal and state levels to promote economic opportunity and 
support innovation that can improve financial services to consumers, businesses, and communities.” US, Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, News Release, 2018-74 “OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter 
Applications from Financial Technology Companies”, (31 July 2018), online: https://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ-2018-74.html.  
9 This report covers only the federal level within the American banking regulatory system. There, the OCC is the 
chartering authority, supervisor, and regulator of national banks. The FDIC has supervision of all banks, both federal 
and state, in relation to deposit insurance. Functionally, this makes the FDIC a concurrent regulator of national 
banks and the primary federal-level body with oversight over state-chartered banks. (Some states, notably Utah, 




ones, which go to the same concerns about the importance of banks to the economy, and the 
particular privileges and prohibitions they have as a result, which spurred the development of 
banking licensing regimes as a whole. To be clear, the banking/commercial separation doctrine is 
not the distinction between banking, securities, and insurance work. It is also not about the 
separate question of whether commercial entities should be permitted to own banks.10 For 
purposes of this report, the banking/commercial separation doctrine concerns the prohibition on 
banks engaging in entirely non-financial commercial businesses. 
As already noted, being a licensed and recognized “bank” confers some important advantages on 
an institution. In particular, because of their access to deposit insurance, banks are able to borrow 
money at reduced rates. Depository insurance, along with banks’ access to liquidity support from 
their jurisdictions’ central bank or equivalent, effectively subsidizes them relative to other 
businesses.11 Banks can avoid consequences of illiquidity that normal commercial vendors 
cannot. Flowing from this, the historic rationales for separating banking and commerce, as 
articulated primarily in the United States, have two main threads:12 
• Systemic risk and banks’ unique privileges: Safety and soundness and systemic stability 
concerns, in various forms through time, have informed the American 
banking/commercial separation doctrine. Bank runs, and bank crises, can have knock-on 
and contagion effects that worsen a crisis almost independent of the size of the 
underlying problem. Access to the banking “safety net” addresses contagion concerns. 
However, these safeguards also mean that banks are insulated from some normal business 
risks, and can borrow money more cheaply as a result. It has been perceived as unfair and 
anticompetitive to allow these special players to compete with regular commercial 
businesses. Moreover, bank regulators would have difficulty extending their regulatory 
                                               
subject to other federal bank regulation and, among other things, are not subject to the banking/commercial 
separation doctrine.) The Federal Reserve Board also has oversight over those state-level chartered banks, a 
minority, which are members of the federal reserve system. In addition, it has jurisdiction over bank holding 
companies – the parent corporations of banks, to whom a separate set of regulatory provisions apply. Since the 
financial crisis and the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the Fed has acquired additional 
oversight powers in relation to “SIFIs” (systemically important financial institutions, including non-bank ones). 
SIFIs and financial holding companies (FHCs), which can engage in a broader range of financial activities including 
e.g., insurance and underwriting, are also not covered here. Vis-à-vis “fintech” companies in particular, the OCC 
and state regulators have been vying for position. The OCC’s restricted charter, discussed below and in Appendix 1, 
was heavily criticized by state regulators (in fact, it was the subject of two lawsuits, which were vacated), who 
consider that states should be have regulatory jurisdiction over fintech companies that are not engaged in the 
traditional banking business. 
10 Mehrsa Baradaran has argued that these two questions – whether banks should be permitted to engage in 
commercial activity, and whether commercial entities should be permitted to own banks – are often conflated in 
policy discussions and scholarly articles. She argues, in fact, that allowing commercial entities to own banks would 
improve systemic stability, reduce contagion and herding effects, reduce the asset-liability mismatch from which 
banks suffer, and incentivize banks to take on less risk and better control their leverage ratios: see Mehrsa 
Baradaran, “Reconsidering the Separation of Banking and Commerce” (2012) 80:2 Geo Wash L Rev 385.  
11 Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
12 These points are drawn primarily from Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and 
Commerce” (2007) 39:4 Conn L Rev 1539; see also Edward L. Symons, Jr., “The ‘Business of Banking’ in 
Historical Perspective” (1983) 51:5 Geo Wash L Rev 676; Bernard Shull, “The Separation of Banking and 
Commerce in the United States: An Examination of Principal Issues” (1999) OCC Economics Working Paper 1999-
1. As Shull has noted, ibid. at p. 7 et seq., the prohibition on banks engaging in commerce distinction has its roots 




reach to other commercial parts of the corporate group, even though those parts’ 
economic viability could affect the connected bank’s safety and soundness. 
• Additional consumer protection and competition concerns, which we can further break 
down into concerns about (a) conflicts of interest and (b) market power/concentration. 
Flowing their superior borrowing abilities as described above, there has also historically 
been a concern in the United States that banks would be able to subsidize any non-bank 
commercial business they engaged in, thereby providing those commercial businesses 
with an unfair market advantage. Because they operate subject to a conflict of interest, 
banks engaging in commerce could also potentially refuse to provide loans to competitors 
of their commercial affiliates, or could require borrowers to do business with their 
commercial affiliates as a condition of obtaining loans. Banks that engage in large-scale 
commercial activity (e.g., Bank of America’s parent company Transamerica in the 1950s, 
whose expansion plans led to the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act; department 
store Montgomery Ward in the 1970s, or Wal-Mart in the early 2000s) may also acquire 
undue market power, allowing them to concentrate the market in anticompetitive ways.13 
In jurisdictions where the banking industry is concentrated and forms a large part of a national 
economy, and where it relies heavily on customer deposits (as the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) has noted is the case in Canada),14 systemic stability, conflicts of interest, and market 
concentration concerns can be especially significant. 
Depository insurance is worth highlighting. It serves both systemic stability and consumer 
protection functions. It plays an important role in boosting the economy by providing certainty to 
market participants and comfort to retail customers, encouraging them not to keep their money 
under the proverbial mattress. The banking/commercial separation doctrine has been justified on 
the basis that it avoids putting additional pressure on depository insurance. As a general rule 
(subject to regulation that prohibits linking deposits to, e.g., proprietary trading, as the Volcker 
Rule in the United States was meant to do), however, depository insurance also creates “moral 
hazard” for banks, which can take greater risks on the understanding that customers’ deposits 
and their own commercial viability are publicly insured. There have also been concerns about the 
fact that, if banks could engage in commercial activity and still rely on depository insurance, 
those public insurers would have to shore up commercial companies in order to shore up their 
banks, even while having no relevant expertise and no insight as to whether those commercial 
entities were solvent. 
                                               
13 Wal-Mart was seeking to form a state-based Industrial Loan Corporation, or ILC, not a federally regulated bank, 
but the point about market concentration is the same. Drawing on descriptions of 20th century, pre-WWII banking 
and industrial regulation in Germany and Japan, Shull, supra note 12, has described additional concerns related to 
cronyism, anticompetitive behaviour, and interlocking elites as associated with close links between banks and 
commercial enterprises.  
14 Financial Stability Board, Peer Review of Canada (30 January 2012), online pdf: Financial Stability Board 




Fintech15 and the changing environment for banking  
Background conditions in each jurisdiction 
Every jurisdiction considered here has established a regulatory regime geared toward bank 
licensing. In other respects, however, financial regulatory structure varies between jurisdictions. 
Some jurisdictions adopt, or mostly adopt, the traditional entity-based regulatory divide between 
banking, securities, and insurance, as Canada does. These are the United States and Japan 
(though Japan has recently floated the possibility of moving to a new “function-based, cross-
sectoral” regulatory approach). Singapore is similar: although it has an integrated financial 
regulator, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), which also performs other functions 
such as providing emergency liquidity support as a lender of last resort, the MAS contains a 
distinct bureau responsible for banking licensing and regulation in particular. 
Of the five jurisdictions discussed here, a formal banking/commercial separation doctrine has 
operated in the three jurisdictions above: in the United States, at the federal level; in Japan; and 
in Singapore. Although the prohibition is quite clearly stated in each of these jurisdictions, each 
one also permits banks to engage in additional business lines that are “ancillary” or “closely 
related” to banking, as noted in Appendix 1 (under the column headed “definition of banking 
business”). Each has also imposed limits on the amount that a bank, through a subsidiary, could 
own of a non-financial business, as noted in Appendix 2 (under the column headed “caps on non-
financial ownership?”). 
As with licensing, some of the jurisdictions in which the banking/commercial separation doctrine 
applies are modifying those rules. None of these three jurisdictions has eliminated the separation 
doctrine entirely, but it is being relaxed in both Japan and Singapore. The first two columns of 
Appendix 2, attached, detail these changes. A more comprehensive review of regulatory change 
in all jurisdictions is provided in Appendix 3.16 Note that the perceived move into genuinely 
commercial, non-financial business lines is still relatively minimal. In Japan, for example, 
regulatory change still seems to contemplate banks moving only into adjacent financial business 
areas. Singapore is now the only jurisdiction that explicitly permits banks, under certain 
conditions, to sell consumer goods outright. (Overall, Japan’s reforms are more extensive, and 
there may be more change to come.)  
By contrast, for historical and path-dependent reasons, there is little indication that the American 
federal banking regime is likely to move away from the banking/commercial separation doctrine 
anytime soon.17 The most salient regulatory change in that jurisdiction concerns the creation of 
                                               
15 I adopt the Financial Stability Board definition of fintech, also endorsed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) and others, as “technology-enabled innovation in financial services that could result in new 
business models, applications, processes or products with an associated material effect on the provision of financial 
services.” Financial Stability Board, “Financial Stability Implications from Fintech: Supervisory and Regulatory 
Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention” (27 June 2017) online pdf: Financial Stability Board 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/R270617.pdf.  
16 Appendix 3 also covers developments in Taiwan. That jurisdiction is not really comparable to Canada’s in its 
general economic structure, so it is not otherwise discussed in this report. 
17 But see Baradaran supra note 1010, and Peter J. Wallison, “Why Are We Still Separating Banking and 
Commerce?” (27 July 2017) online: American Banker <https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/why-are-we-still-




“restricted” bank charters, and the role of the federal agencies versus the states in seizing the 
regulatory field within which fintech companies will operate. The fundamental question there 
may be to what extent federal bank charters, with their associated banking/commercial 
separation doctrine, will continue to be relevant. Arguably, substantial fintech business is already 
beginning to circumvent federal banking regulation, either by relying on competing state-level 
regulation (ILCs or newer strategies) to become licensed, and/or by entering into partnerships 
and joint operation agreements with existing, licensed state banks to provide necessary 
depository and back-office components. The OCC’s controversial move to allow “restricted” 
banks charters reflects its concern about remaining relevant as a regulator.  
The other two jurisdictions considered, Australia and the UK, operate “twin peaks” regulatory 
regimes.18 A twin peaks approach was adopted first in Australia, and then, after the financial 
crisis, in the UK. Other jurisdictions have moved to it since, including the Netherlands and most 
recently, in 2018, South Africa. The main argument for the twin peaks approach is that as a result 
of technological and business process change, there has been a “blurring of boundaries” across 
the traditional entity-based industry sectors of banking, securities, and insurance, with the result 
that regulation was becoming ineffective. The implication is also that banks are less “special” 
than they once were.19 Thus, rather than having three entity-based regulators with jurisdiction 
over the three traditional financial sectors (banking, securities, and insurance), the model 
provides for two cross-sectoral regulators: one responsible for prudential regulation, and one for 
market conduct / consumer protection, both of which operate across all three industry sectors. 
In Australia, responsibility is allocated between the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA), which carries out prudential regulation, and the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) with regard to market conduct and consumer protection regulation. In the 
UK, the “twin peaks” are the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), a division of Bank of 
England; and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), for market conduct and consumer 
protection matters.20 The traditional prudential concerns of banking regulators remain, 
predictably, with the prudential regulatory authorities. However, because of the way that 
regulatory jurisdiction is divided in these jurisdictions, and because of the fundamental concerns 
about blurring of boundaries and technological change that informs the model, twin peaks 
jurisdictions tend not to have a banking/commercial separation embedded in statute or 
regulation. 
                                               
18 The “twin peaks” model was developed in a 1995 paper by Michael Taylor, then an academic and former Bank of 
England staffer. Michael Taylor, “Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century” (December 1995) 
online pdf: Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d620fce4b049bf4cd5be9b/t/55241159e4b0c8f3afe1d11e/1428427097907/
Twin+Peaks+A+regulatory+structure+for+the+new+century.pdf>.  
19 See also Michael Taylor, “Twin Peaks Revisited… a second chance for regulatory reform” (September 2009) 
online pdf: Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation 
<http://static1.squarespace.com/static/54d620fce4b049bf4cd5be9b/t/55241044e4b03769e017208a/1428426820095/
Twin+Peaks+Revisited.pdf>; Ricks, supra note 5. 
20 Banking in the UK is also subject, as of this writing, to European Union (EU) Regulations, and it has “transposed” 
key EU Directives into its domestic law. EU institutions have directive and incentive powers. Most activity and most 
regulation, including bank licensing, still takes place at the member state level. This report only discusses EU 
Directives to the extent that they are apply in the UK as of the date of the report. The interaction between EU and 





These five jurisdictions rely on the banking/commercial separation doctrine to different degrees. 
Arrayed along a spectrum, with no reliance on the banking/commercial separation doctrine at the 





Spectrum: Jurisdictions described in terms of the centrality of the banking/commercial separation doctrine to their regulatory regimes, with 
least reliance on the left and most reliance on the right.
UK and Australia
- Twin peaks: no banking/commercial 
separation doctrine. Prudential regs 
impose de facto limits on viability of 
non-financial activities in UK but not 
Australia (different interpretations of 
similar provisions)
- Open Banking
- Consumer data rights
- banking licenses expanding beyond 
traditional banking industry players 
(explicitly or implicitly)
Japan
- 2016 Banking Act amendments incl 
relaxing income dependency 
provisions, new fintech investment 
scope. Also heightened risk 
management, governance, dislcosure 
obligations
- 2017 Banking Act amendments 
provide for open APIs, similar to 
Open Banking
- June 2018 policy document 
contemplates moving away from 
entity-based regulation (presumably 
also away from banking / commercial 
separation)
Singapore
- 2017 Anti-Commingling Paper 
expands banks' scope to engage in 
non-financial business that is "related 
or complementary" to core financial 
business, incl operating digital 
platforms that match buyers & 
sellers, selling consumer goods
- new 10% limit (down from 15%) on 
banks' non-financial businesses
United States
- banking / commercial separation 
doctrine for fed banks, though 
permissible "ancillary" businesses can 
be extensive
- new "restricted charter" by OCC, 
regulatory competition with states 
for fintech oversight
- question about continued relevance 
of tight traditional definition of 




Hot topics affecting the “business of banking” today – what might be “commercial”? 
At this point, the “hottest topics” touching on banking and fintech generally, across these 
jurisdictions, seem to be focused on: banks’ and financial institutions’ ability to deploy data; 
their ability to develop and/or compete or collaborate with retail payment systems for e-
commerce,21 with associated requirements to ensure data security and to manage operational 
risk; Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), which are the software “plug” to securely 
connect one set of data with another program; and Open Banking (whether it is encouraged or, as 
in Australia and the UK, mandated).22  
Banks see opportunities associated with technological change, particularly around the 
deployment of data, the creation of software APIs, and the commercialization of back-office 
operational systems. For example, if banks are permitted to sell products and services they have 
developed in-house, they could participate in all aspects of the retail payment system 
infrastructure, and provide their products and services to third parties. As well, APIs are the 
backbone of Open Banking initiatives, but APIs are used whenever a software application 
connects to a user (e.g., when I look for things “near me” on google maps). Another significant 
opportunity could be around the commercialization of banks’ risk analytics, governance, and 
management systems, including those designed to manage operational risk associated with 
outsourcing of key functions to Third Party Providers (TPPs), something that is done by any 
number of potential non-financial customers. So far, there seems to have been considerably less 
interest in selling physical products such as “smart appliances”.23 
Significantly, many of these new business opportunities are still basically financial, rather than 
purely commercial, in nature. Note that financially-based businesses, even including e.g., the 
permission Singapore has given banks to create digital platforms that match buyers and sellers of 
consumer goods, still fall under financial, and thus not non-financial commercial, activity. That 
kind of business is already happening, at least in jurisdictions such as the UK (see, e.g., HSBC’s 
we.trade product).  
Within this in mind, it is worth considering what exactly would be prohibited by the 
banking/commercial separation doctrine, where “commercial” means truly non-financial 
                                               
21 A helpful article on the changing retail payments environment is Adam Levitin, “Pandora’s Digital Box: The 
Promise and Perils of Digital Wallets” (2018) 166:2 U PA L Rev 305-376. 
22 Although it is not part of this project’s narrow remit, Open Banking initiatives are probably the most significant 
regulatory changes in Australia and the UK (where the UK follows EU directives). In these jurisdictions, Open 
Banking platforms have been struck in response to the perception that banks are serving customers poorly, and are 
taking advantage of their market power. The UK has also developed other initiatives geared toward opening up the 
banking sector to “challenger banks” – notably a new requirement that the UK’s nine largest banks pass on the 
details of small businesses they have turned down for finance to three Government designated finance platforms, so 
they can seek potential funding from other lenders; and HM Treasury’s direction to the British Standards Institution 
to create a guidance document to support FinTechs in engaging with legacy financial institutions. 
23 Before the financial crisis, even car manufacturers’ businesses centred more around car loan financing and back-
office financial arrangements than around profits derived from the actual manufacture and sale of physical vehicles. 
In 2004, eighty percent of General Motors’ profits derived from its financial arm, General Motors Automotive Bank 
(GMAC) (which, of course, had to be bailed out during the financial crisis). Lauren Etter, “Is General Motors 
Unraveling?” Wall St. J., April 8, 2006, at A7. The car companies have moved substantially out of the financing 
business in the years since the financial crisis, such that financing accounted for only slightly more than 8% of GM’s 




commercial activity. Most of the hot topics above substantially fit within the existing boundaries 
of financial services. Only a smaller section is likely truly “commercial,” in the sense of not 
being financial and not being ancillary to carrying out a financial business. The table below 
draws the distinction. For a concrete sense of what non-financial commercial businesses banks 
may branch out into in future, the large Australian banks’ websites are especially helpful (see, 
e.g., the footnote to Westpac’s principal investments immediately below).  
 
Fintech that falls under “finance” or other 
permitted activities and is already being 
done, or could be done 
Some examples of “fintech” or deployment 
of fintech, which might extend beyond 
finance to “commercial activities” 
Investing in new (financial and non-financial) 
tech companies through commercial 
partnerships, as RBC Ventures Inc.,24 BMO,25 
Scotiabank;26 or investing through IP support 
and licensing, as TD 27 does; or providing 
data lab for university co-op students, as 
CIBC28 does. (More activities undertaken 
through US state-based subsidiaries / sister 
companies, not covered at these links.)  
Investing directly in new tech companies 
without the need for a commercial partnership 
agreement, as the large Australian banks (see 
e.g., Westpac29) do – ventures include startups 
for “optimising on-farm efficiencies,” 
matching customers with local real estate 
agents; other partners and investments cover 
AI-powered data analysis, “quantum 
technology that encrypts confidential data,” 
software for preventing and solving crime, a 
local social media platform, and more 
Using data generated from customers’ 
banking activity to sell them other financial 
products and services – e.g., refer them to 
their brokerage or trading arms, target them 
better for the sale of particular insurance or 
investment products, etc.  
- Could be augmented by large-n or 
“big data” trend analysis 
Using data generated from customers’ 
banking activity, including large-n or “big 
data” trends, to sell them non-financial 
products and services – various 
                                               
24 “Ventures”, online: RBC Ventures <https://www.rbcventures.ca/ventures/en>. 
25 “BMO Partners with BioConnect to Launch Biometric Authentication Platform for Commercial and Corporate 
Clients” (Last modified 22 October 2018), online: BMO <https://newsroom.bmo.com/2018-10-22-BMO-Partners-
with-BioConnect-to-Launch-Biometric-Authentication-Platform-for-Commercial-and-Corporate-Clients>.  
26 Diana Hart, “Going Global: the Power of Partnering with LatAm Startups”, online: Scotiabank 
<https://www.scotiabank.com/corporate/en/home/media-centre/media-centre/going-global-the-power-of-partnering-
with-latam-startups.html>.  
27 “TD Extends $30 million Fintech Investment Pool to Unique Patent Program”, online: TD 
<http://td.mediaroom.com/2017-10-04-TD-Extends-30-million-Fintech-Investment-Pool-to-Unique-Patent-
Program>.  
28 Armina Ligaya, “CIBC launches data lab in Waterloo to harness fintech talent”, Financial Post (11 May 2017), 
online: <https://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/cibc-launches-data-lab-in-waterloo-to-harness-fintech-
talent>.  




Matching buyers and sellers: e.g., WeTrade 
(HSBC’s product), which sets up the payment 
platform that matches buyers and sellers of 
goods, e.g., wholesale or retail olive oil 
Using data generated from matching buyers 
and sellers to advertise or promote other 
products (for a fee): e.g., WeTrade offering 
balsamic vinegar to buyers of olive oil 
E-commerce and retail payments utilities: 
creating APIs that link financial data to other 
platforms and services (like competitor to 
PayPal, ApplePay, or perhaps to credit cards) 
Using bank-based electronic payment 
systems, which capture extensive information 
about consumer purchasing practices, to 
provide additional non-financial services (e.g. 
loyalty programs, dispute resolution services, 
product reviews) 
New clearing and settlement infrastructure 
(using distributed ledger technology or 
otherwise) for wholesale clearing and 
settlement, securities ownership trail, other 
Commercially building out and marketing 
clearing and settlement infrastructure abroad 
Building cyber-security and system 
integrity/supervision/governance tools 
(including using biometrics), or customer due 
diligence tools, based on banks’ expertise, 
infrastructure, and access to data 
Marketing cyber-security and system 
integrity/supervision/governance tools 
(including e.g., using biometrics), or customer 
due diligence tools, to non-bank users 
Building and selling other finance-related 
consulting services based on banks’ access to 
data. e.g., investment advice (including to 
some extent via “robo-advisors”), consumer-
facing trading services, debt management 
tools, spending tracking and budgeting 
software 
- Could be augmented with machine 
learning-based tools 
Building and selling other non-financial 
consulting services based on banks’ access to 
data. E.g., research services? 
Creating new crypto-assets, or investing in 
them.  
Offering business advice or consulting 
services to crypto community? 
Creating distributed ledgers that can be useful 
for completing financial transactions, 
improving record keeping.  
Using bank-created distributed ledger-based 
technologies as a foundation for a broader set 
of “smart contracts” that could be made 
available to Canadian individuals and 
institutions, potentially disintermediating 
many common transactions as well as e.g., 
wills and probate, divorce settlements, other. 
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Selling distributed ledger structure to other 
bodies that require incorruptible record-
keeping – e.g., health services, police, etc. 
Creating or investing in other kinds of 
financial products that depend on new 
technology: e.g., new mechanisms (including 
on the blockchain) for remittance and other 
cross-border transactions, new mobile money 
or mobile banking tools for use within 
Canada and abroad. 
Using data created by remittance and other 
cross-border transaction information to sell 
people geographically-targeted products (e.g., 
news feeds, flights, SIM cards). 
 
Selling distributed ledger system to 
international shippers, border security, other 
entities with cross-border record-keeping and 
settlement needs beyond the financial 
Developing commercial arbitration platforms 
in case of disputes associated with bank 
functions (e.g., robo-advising or trading, 
challenges to payment system or settlement 
when matching buyers and sellers on a 
platform like WeTrade) 
- Could be augmented with machine 
learning-based tools 
Expanding bank-created dispute resolution 
tools to broader dispute resolution context 
(including private commercial dispute 
resolution beyond the bank context, e.g., 
between clients, on a fee-for-service or 
subscription basis); and providing associated 
professional, including legal, advice.  
Selling customers’ data (because data as an 
asset, in the same way that office furniture is 
an asset) 
Developing business lines based on selling 
customers’ data to third parties 
Looking at the difference between fintech activity already being carried out, and non-financial 
commercial activity in the right-hand column, it is not obvious that the line between them 
constitutes a clear line between safety and fragility. Extensions as imagined in the right-hand 
column are potentially significant, in consumer protection and systemic stability terms, but this is 
because of their potentially enormous reach, not because of their “commercial” nature.  
It is therefore not obvious what function the banking/commercial separation doctrine in 
particular is serving, as compared to, for example, general banking regulation that is geared 
explicitly toward ensuring that all of a bank’s business conduct is subject to prudential, customer 
protection, and pro-competitive regulatory provisions. 
Technological change, the financial crisis, and prudential regulation  
The table above suggests that the “hot topics” of today do not necessarily engage the 
banking/commercial separation doctrine that much; on its own, this does not mean that the 
doctrine is not still important. Recent change to the business of banking, however, and new 
learning from the hard experience of the financial crisis, suggest that the banking/commercial 
separation doctrine may no longer be the ideal tool for addressing these concerns.  
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As noted above, one of the historical justifications for the banking/commercial separation 
doctrine centred around mitigating systemic risk, and limiting access to the particular privileges 
(depository insurance, LOLR liquidity support) that banks enjoyed because of states’ efforts to 
limit systemic risk. But one of the key lessons from the financial crisis has been that non-bank 
financial businesses can be every bit as systemically significant as bank businesses, and that risk 
and contagion can spread across the financial sectors of banking, securities, and insurance. By 
necessity in the acute phase of the crisis, governments extended massive emergency liquidity 
support, and acted as LOLR, to many institutions that were not traditional banks. The boundaries 
could not be maintained. Since the financial crisis, it has therefore been recognized that 
safeguarding systemic stability requires that regulators and governments bring a wider lens to 
their task. If governments may potentially be expected to provide support to institutions beyond 
their pure banking functions, then prudential standards should logically apply across all 
potentially relevant business lines.  
Prudential regulation – which applies across all five jurisdictions discussed here – has deepened 
and evolved over the past few decades. Prudential provisions now apply not only to traditional 
banks, but also in many cases to financial institutions as a whole. They encompass considerable 
governance, prudential / safety and soundness standards, and resolution provisions, and they do 
so on explicit, transparent, and principled grounds. Financial stability regulators such as the Bank 
of England, the European Central Bank, and the US Federal Reserve have gained regulatory and 
supervisory powers since the financial crisis. Contemporary analytical methods are both 
extensive and qualitatively sophisticated. New prudential tools, not available when the 
banking/commercial separation doctrine was entrenched in US federal law in the 1950s (let alone 
earlier), are now available.  
Consider stress testing, an approach that has been adopted across most jurisdictions with respect 
to at least the largest financial institutions. As the diagram below illustrates, stress testing can 
deploy data to assess risk along multiple different axes, producing a comprehensive and nuanced 
understanding of an institution’s resilience, and likely addressing systemic risk concerns much 
more accurately than the bright-line banking/commercial separation doctrine could do: 30 
                                               
30 Figure from Michael P. Malloy, “Stressing Out: New Guidance on Stress Testing for Large Banking 
Organizations” (2012) 31:8 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report 1, at 3 (describing the US OCC, Fed & 
FDIC Guidance on Stress Testing. US OCC, the Federal Reserve & FDIC, Notice, “Supervisory Guidance on Stress 
Testing for Banking Organizations with More Than $10 Billion in Total Consolidated Assets” (17 May 2012) 77 
Fed Reg 29, 458). Section 165(i) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA), Pub L 
No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 1431-1432, § 165(i) (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)), requires specified 
companies to conduct annual stress tests pursuant to regulations prescribed by their respective primary financial 




At the same time, banking regulation is no longer concerned with preventing any failures ever, 
for fear of not being able to control them.31 Prudential regulation can be too onerous if it prevents 
banks from engaging in the liquidity, maturity, and credit transformation functions that help 
power the economy. Since the financial crisis, it has been generally recognized that regulation’s 
main concern should be mitigating the systemic, macroprudential risks, including contagion risk, 
associated with particular institutions’ failure – not with any institution’s failure on its own.32 In 
this regard, too, regulatory thinking has moved away from a binary, bright-line approach to one 
that considers a bank’s business within a larger context, by reference to the risks it presents to the 
system as a whole. 
The UK versus Australia: Interpreting prudential requirements differently 
In practical terms, these prudential regulatory requirements have the potential to do much of the 
work that bright-line scope-of-business prohibitions, i.e., that the banking/commercial separation 
doctrine, would have aimed to do in the last century. The prudential regulatory requirements to 
which banks are subject can be interpreted to impose real restrictions on the activities in which a 
bank engages. Apparently, they are interpreted in this restrictive way by at least some major 
banks in the UK. However, substantially identical provisions are not interpreted in this way by at 
least some major banks in Australia.33 As “twin peaks” jurisdictions, neither the UK nor 
Australia has a banking/commercial separation doctrine. In any jurisdiction that is considering 
softening or eliminating that doctrine, these jurisdictions’ divergent experience with the impact 
of prudential regulation merits attention. 
                                               
31 See, e.g., UK Bank of England, Prudential Regulatory Authority, “The Prudential Regulation Authority’s 
approach to banking supervision” (31 October 2018), online pdf:  
<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/publication/2018/pra-approach-documents-2018> at 6 (“it 
is not our role to ensure that no firm fails. Therefore, a key principle underlying our approach is that we do not seek 
to operate a zero-failure regime. We work with the Bank of England … as UK resolution authority to ensure that any 
firms that fail do so in an orderly manner.”) 
32 Armour et al., supra note 3 at 292-93. 
33 The below is based on confidential conversations between the author and individuals within large UK-based and 
Australian banks. 
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tempted to say “stress”—the utility of stress testing as a 
risk recognition and risk management tool. 25 
 Understanding the risks confronting a banking 
enterprise is not simply a matter of drawing infer-
ences from loan terms and credit ratings; it must also 
include an appreciation of “the potential impact of 
stressful events and circumstances on their financial 
condition.” 26 In requiring larger financial institutions 
to conduct annual stress tests, 27 the DFA was, in effect, 
acknowledging one hard lesson of the 2008 melt-
down, which had  underscored the need for banking 
organizations to incorporate stress testing into their 
risk management practices, demonstrating that bank-
ing organizations unprepared for stressful events and 
circumstances can suffer acute threats to their financial 
condition and viability. 28 
 Likewise, in issuing  Guidance on Stress Testing , the 
OCC, the Fed, and the FDIC sought to emphasize 
the risk management aspects of testing, with the 
hope of better equipping banking organizations 
“to address a range of adverse outcomes.” 29 It may 
be natural to assume that there is a close linkage 
between the DFA mandate and the three agencies’ 
formal guidance. This is obviously true as a mat-
ter of fact—the guidance applies to precisely those 
institutions subject to the DFA  mandate 30 - but, as 
we shall see later, 31 in principle there is no linkage 
between the statutory mandate and the administra-
tive guidance. 32 
 Whatever its status, the guidance is intended to 
 provide “broad principles a banking organization 33 
should follow in stress testing activities.” 34 In for-
mulating these principles, the agencies expected that 
stress testing would occur at various organizational 
levels, from enterprise-wide to specific products or 
asset categories. Various stress test applications would 
be conducted within these organizational contexts, 
including capital and liquidity testing, among others. 35 
This matrix defines the “stress testing framework.” ( See 
Figure 2,  infra. ) 
 The agencies’  Guidance does not offer specifics, but 
it does offer five “general principles that a banking 
organization should apply in implementing [the stress 
testing] framework.” 36 ( See Figure 3,  infra .) Principle 
1 counsels inclusiveness as to a banking organization’s 
exposures, activities, and risks, both on and off the bal-
ance sheet. 37 Risks covered in the framework include, 
but are not limited to, “credit, market, operational, 
interest-rate, liquidity, country, and strategic risk.” 38 A 
failure of inclusiveness “could give a false sense of com-
fort,” 39 which would impair the efficacy of the stress 
testing framework. 
 Principle 2 counsels interactivity in stress testing. 
The danger is that risk analysis can take too linear 
an approach, in which case there would be no check 
on the “element of uncertainty due to assumptions, 
limitations, and other factors associated with using 
past performance measures and forward-looking esti-
mates.” 40 For this reason, the  Guidance emphasized 
the need for multiple stress testing approaches. 41 
The resulting methodological complexity naturally 
requires effort to ensure that each approach employed 
is “conceptually sound.” 42 There is an inherent ten-
sion in employing multiple approaches in stress 
testing, of course: 
 Stress tests usually vary in design and complexity, 
including the number of factors employed and the 
degree of stress applied. A banking organization 
should ensure that the complexity of any given 












 Figure 2: Effective Stress Testing Framework 
(Different stress tests take differing cuts at the data)
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From their inception, the Basel Capital Adequacy Accords have sought to develop prudential 
standards for international financial institutions, to help establish a baseline set of protections 
against the main kinds of risks run by those institutions. In particular, they were expected to 
observe capital requirements and maintain liquidity buffers to address market risk (mainly, the 
risk that the market for particular investments will go down – something that carries many 
serious knock-on effects for leveraged institutions), and credit risk (essentially the risk that 
counterparties will default or not fulfill a contractual agreement, or that borrowers will not repay 
a loan). The Basel II Accords, published in 2004, required for the first time that international 
financial institutions also account for operational risk (meaning the failure of people or 
processes, including such risks as cybersecurity breaches, internal fraud, or the like – all things 
with potential relevance to non-financial businesses). They also required that institutions’ 
balance sheets report all the institutions’ businesses on a consolidated basis. While not legally 
binding themselves, the Capital Accords are accepted, essentially mandatory, practice for any 
international financial institution, and they have been incorporated into domestic standards 
across most of the world.  
Basel II’s provisions explicitly applies as a matter of formal law to UK banks, because those 
provisions were incorporated into EU Directive 2006/48/EC. This Directive extended Basel 
provisions to all member state banking institutions and not just those involved in international 
banking. The large majority of this Directive was, in turn, incorporated into UK law.34 In 2013, 
Basel III produced another round of reforms, but not reforms that altered the basic shape of the 
Basel II requirements around consolidated financials. The EU’s 2013 CRD IV (reflecting 
changes arising from Basel III), for example, do not change the consolidation requirements. 
Indeed, Basel II’s provisions have been strengthened through new post-financial crisis 
requirements around capital adequacy (minimum capital requirements plus, under Basel III, 
capital buffers), liquidity, internal risk management, institutional resilience as assessed through 
stress testing, and orderly resolution regimes. 
As a functional matter, this has reportedly had a profound impact on UK banking business. At 
least some and perhaps most, or even all, large UK-based banks have interpreted the prudential 
regulatory provisions, and the requirement that financials be consolidated, to mean that they 
would have to operate any commercial business as if it was a banking business. That is, the bank 
would have to comply with capital adequacy, liquidity, risk management, and other regulations 
in regard to the commercial business, as with the bank as a whole. Because of the cost overhang 
this imposes, running a non-financial commercial business has been perceived within at least 
some large UK-based banks to be economically non-viable. A bank-owned chain of coffee 
shops, for example, would not be competitive with a chain of coffee shops not owned by a bank. 
The UK’s ring-fencing initiative, which came into effect on 1 January 2019, has likely changed 
this situation for UK banks in the sense that now, depository banking business must be fully 
                                               
34 Incorporation was done via the Prudential Handbook of the FSA (as it then was), GENPRU and BIPRU sections: 
see UK, HM Treasury, “Transposition Table: Implementing Directive 2006/48/EC (Banking Consolidation 
Directive)” (5 January 2010), online: <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/implementing-amendments-
to-the-capital-requirements-directive>. Relevant sections require that “credit institutions” (aka banks) report on all 
activities, and maintain capital etc., on a consolidated basis, are Articles 71, 75, 125-127, 133, and 134 of the EU 
Directive. For some additional explanation, see Andrew McKnight, “Basel 2: the implementation in the UK of its 




walled off from other business lines. Banks in the UK therefore now have a choice about how to 
treat any non-financial businesses in which they engage. In the very unlikely event that a 
commercial business could somehow be located “inside the ring-fence,” alongside depository 
banking functions, that business would have to be consolidated for financial reporting purposes. 
The full suite of prudential regulatory obligations would presumably apply. If the commercial 
business were “outside the ring-fence,” then it would be a separate business and required to 
operate at arm’s length from the depository banking business, completely without access to any 
of the distinctive privileges that banks enjoy.35 Functionally, what this means is that ring-fenced 
UK banks will not be engaging in non-financial commercial activity and, in fact, will not be 
engaging in some forms of financial activity either; those businesses will move to entities outside 
the ring fence. This likely substantially addresses the systemic stability and consumer protection 
concerns, described above, that underpin the banking/commercial separation doctrine. 
In Australia, by contrast, prudential regulation has not had the same effect. The difference seems 
to be largely a matter of interpretation. Australian banks (licensed as “authorised deposit-taking 
institutions”, or ADIs) do not read the prudential regulatory requirements that apply to them in a 
way that constrains their investments in non-financial businesses. On the contrary, they have 
been making many such investments. Australia has a concentrated and mature banking market, 
within which margins on key business lines are small, and shrinking. Reportedly, the view 
among all four of Australia’s large banks is that “unless they diversify their businesses, they will 
not survive”.36 Those ADIs are leveraging their data and systems expertise to engage in a range 
of non-financial commercial ventures. 
The Basel Capital Accords have been substantially adopted in Australia, with some relatively 
minor modifications.37 They are implemented through prudential standards developed by 
APRA.38 Along with the common capital adequacy, liquidity, risk management and governance 
requirements, another standard, discussed further below, that would be relevant to an Australian 
ADI’s non-financial commercial subsidiary would be Prudential Standard APS 222 
“Associations with Related Entities”.39  
Significantly, it seems that Australian ADIs read the bulk of these prudential standards as simply 
not relevant to a subsidiary that does not take deposits, and does not make loans. The view is that 
such a subsidiary is not running market risk or credit risk to any significant degree. (If the ADI 
invested some seed capital in a commercial start-up, credit risk would be relevant. So far, such 
investments have not been large.) Effectively, the only risk that generally would apply to an 
ADI’s non-financial subsidiary would be operational risk, which is also understood to capture 
reputational risk and governance risk. The interpretation is simply that the other prudential 
regulatory obligations do not apply.  
                                               
35 For more information see “The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Ring-fenced Bodies and Core 
Activities) Order 2014” (UK), SI 2014/1960.  
36 Per Australian bank employee, supra note 33. 
37 Reserve Bank of Australia, Financial Stability Review – September 2013 “Box B: The Basel III Capital Reforms 
in Australia” at https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2013/sep/box-b.html.  
38 The standards and guidance that apply to ADIs are on APRA’s website at https://www.apra.gov.au/adi-standards-
and-guidance.  
39 The version currently in force is at https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2014L01654. A revised version, set to 




Moreover, since ADIs (that is, Australian banks) generally report their financials on a 
consolidated basis, any calculations the ADI makes about e.g., the operational risk associated 
with a new data company in which it has invested would be rolled into overall consolidated 
reporting, not broken out or visible on the face of the document. Unlike the fine-grained analysis 
that goes into the rest of the reporting on e.g., credit risk and the calculation of capital, 
operational risk assessments apparently tend to be quite crude. The result is that any capital set 
aside to cover the risks associated with a non-financial commercial business would tend to be 
largely invisible, and only quantified in a “ballpark” fashion. 
It is not clear why UK and Australian banks would interpret similar provisions so differently. 
The Australian interpretation seems more logical, strictly speaking, in terms of the primary kinds 
of risk that a non-financial commercial subsidiary might be running. It is the British 
interpretation that is more difficult to explain. Regulatory and industry culture (including the 
City’s famous set of informal norms)40 may play a role. Regardless, ring-fencing in the UK will 
change the ground rules, and may well open the door to UK banks engaging in new business 
lines “outside” the fence.  
The Australian interpretation is insufficient, however, if the concern is defending against the 
systemic risk and consumer protection concerns that produced the banking/commercial 
separation doctrine. In the event that one of the four large Australian ADIs engaged in non-
financial commercial business, of a sufficient magnitude to potentially affect its overall viability 
and therefore potentially systemic stability in Australia, it is not certain that the ADI would have 
adequate safety and soundness strategies in place to manage those risks on its own.41 Unlike the 
ring-fencing arrangement now in place in the UK, Australian depository insurance and LOLR 
mechanisms would potentially be exposed as a result. Similarly, without a detailed sense of the 
magnitude of an ADI’s non-financial commercial business or its relationships to the ADI’s 
traditional banking functions, it is very difficult to determine whether conflicts of interest or 
market concentration concerns are present. Both have the potential to undermine consumer 
protection. 
Regulators may persist in thinking “a bank is a bank is a bank” 
Australian regulatory requirements are silent with respect to Australian banks’ interpretation of 
the prudential requirements, perhaps because the non-financial commercial businesses that 
Australian banks are running are still so new and relatively small. Notwithstanding the changing 
nature of the banking business in Australia, APRA prudential standards do not require ADIs to 
capture even the operational risks associated with their non-financial commercial businesses in a 
comprehensive or transparent way.  
For example, Prudential Standard APS 222 requires ADIs to “give due consideration to the risks 
associated with the corporate group of which they are a member and to ensure they are not 
exposed to excessive risk as a result of their associations and dealings with related entities”.42 
                                               
40 See, e.g., John Armour & David Skeel, “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar 
Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation” (2007) 95 Geo. LJ 1727. 
41 In case this sounds far-fetched, consider Enron – a corporation whose generally viable energy business was 
swamped, in size and risk, by its financial business. In Australia as of 1 January 2020, as noted in Appendix 2, ADIs 
must notify APRA prior to “committing to any proposed exposure to a related entity that is greater than, or equal to, 
10 per cent of the ADI’s Tier 1 Capital.”  
42 See supra note 39. 
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Under the version of APS 222 currently in force, the related entities on which an ADI must 
report are clearly only financial businesses. The Standard and associated disclosure form requires 
that ADIs report on their banking subsidiaries (Australian-owned, foreign subsidiaries, branches 
of foreign banks), building societies, credit unions, and “other ADIs” – but a genuinely 
commercial, non-financial business would of course be none of those things. This is not to say 
that an ADI could not operate a commercial, non-financial business; only that if it did so, the 
forms do not contemplate that the ADI report on that business. 
A proposed revised version of APS 222 is set to come into force on 1 January 2020.43 Under it, 
Australian banks will have slightly augmented obligations to disclose risks of commercial 
businesses they undertake. The standard and its associated disclosure form require that ADIs 
report their twenty largest exposures to related entities, which are now divided into “banking, 
insurance, superannuation, SPV, other financial institution, and other counterparties”.44 “Other 
counterparties” is defined to include “any related entity that is not a banking institution, an SPV, 
insurance corporation, superannuation fund or other financial institutions”. To the extent that a 
bank’s non-financial commercial business is a counterparty, and is within the bank’s twenty 
largest exposures, it would therefore be included. However, there is no residual “other related 
entities” category. A non-financial, commercial related entity that is not a “counterparty”, at least 
in the strict sense of being on the other side of a contract, would not be included even if it was 
within the bank’s twenty largest exposures.  
In view of the changing nature of banking, APS 222 seems limited in its coverage. It may not 
capture all the businesses that banks will be engaging in, at scale, in five years’ time. In other 
words, “APRA still thinks a bank is a bank is a bank”.45 At a minimum, applicable prudential 
standards should require banks to be more transparent about the risks (operational and otherwise) 
associated with the non-financial commercial businesses they are running. To the extent that 
those businesses could become sizeable and could impact stability in the banking sector, due 
consideration of those risks on the bank’s part, and disclosure of the extent of that due 
consideration, are important. Greater guidance about precisely which risks are relevant to a non-
financial commercial business (i.e., about whether the existing Australian or UK industry 
interpretations should govern) would also be useful.   
Protecting consumers, avoiding conflicts of interest, minimizing market concentration 
The other main historical justification for the banking/commercial separation doctrine has been 
the need to protect customers, by limiting conflicts of interest on the part of banks, promoting 
competition within the sector, and controlling market concentration. In fact, concerns about 
conflicts of interest, market power, and market concentration vis-à-vis banks in particular may be 
less severe today, because of the multiple non-bank means by which businesses can now access 
capital – at least in those jurisdictions where the banking and financial sector are competitive and 
                                               
43 Ibid.: see APRA, “Revisions to the related parties framework for authorised deposit-taking institutions” (July 
2018):  https://www.apra.gov.au/revisions-related-parties-framework-authorised-deposit-taking-institutions. The 
comment period has closed. Similar standards for reporting in relation for large exposures have already come into 
force.  
44 See the Draft Reporting Standard ARS 222, at 
https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/draft_reporting_standard_ars_222.0_exposures_to_related_entities_july_
20.pdf.  




not excessively concentrated. Given that there are multiple players in the space today, this 
suggests that that sector-specific prohibitions on banks specifically engaging in commercial 
business may no longer make sense. Two things would seem to be essential, however: one would 
be establishing a level playing field, which treated equally all institutions that provided access to 
finance, that played systemically important roles within the financial markets, and that had 
access to customers’ data; and the other would be to ensure that competition was not stymied 
because of (formal or informal) barriers to entry, or anticompetitive conditions that unduly 
favour incumbents.46  
A June 2018 policy document from Japan’s regulator, the Financial Services Agency, captures 
the contemporary shift in regulatory approach, toward a more comprehensive perspective that 
relies especially on prudential regulation. The report suggests that “[t]here is room to reconsider 
the focus placed on regulations on scope of permissible business of banks and banking groups”, 
that banks and other business companies should be able to “compete on an equal footing basis, 
with attention to the differences in the effectiveness of avoiding risk in other business to the 
basic lines of business of banks”, and that it will be necessary “to update prudential regulations 
which accommodate risks of new types of business” and “to consider whether objectives and 
coverage of safety nets may change”.47 
Building in safeguards to address the concerns underlying the separation 
doctrine  
The above suggests that the traditional banking/commercial separation doctrine had more 
salience in the 19th and 20th centuries than it does today. It is increasingly artificial, and indeed 
could lead to suboptimal regulatory policy, when one considers the substantial risks that also 
flow from a bank’s participation in other, financial (as opposed to non-financial commercial) 
business lines. A more comprehensive, more direct, and more transparent mechanism is required 
to get to the root challenges of ensuring systemic stability, and protecting consumers. Across the 
jurisdictions surveyed here, the following three general strategies stand out: 
1. Safeguarding systemic stability: the nexus between special banking privileges and 
regulatory oversight  
The special privileges that banks have traditionally enjoyed, such as access to deposit insurance 
and LOLR liquidity support, exist to serve systemic stability functions and to ensure the 
economy continues to function well. These special privileges should not be extended to cover 
large swaths of the economy, and should not be extended beyond the purposes for which they 
exist.   
                                               
46 See, e.g., the discussion of the New Payments Platform in Australia at Appendix 3. 
47 Japan, Financial System Council, Study Group on the Financial System, Toward function-based, cross-sectoral 
financial regulations (Provisional translated Interim Note) (19 June 2018), online pdf: 
<https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/singie_kinyu/20180619/gaiyou_eng.pdf>. Underlying full report available 
in Japanese only. The JFSA’s interim discussion paper has not yet produced concrete outcomes, and it is more 
ambitious than anything being contemplated in Canada in that it considers the value of a move away from an entity-
based regulatory framework toward more “function-based, cross-sectoral” regulation (which suggests a twin peaks 
regulatory structure or some other wide-ranging reform), “in light of unbundling and rebundling … to apply the 
same rules to activities within the same functions and risks”. 
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In this regard, banking licenses remain a meaningful hurdle. They impose valuable entry 
requirements on institutions that want access to deposit insurance and other banking privileges. It 
is also generally recognized that being a licensed and recognized “bank” has a strong signaling 
effect for consumers. New “restricted” licenses may serve a useful function in ensuring adequate 
competition exists within the banking sector, and in ensuring that barriers to entry do not cause 
fintechs to avoid banking regulation altogether (thereby depriving their customers of deposit 
insurance, and increasing systemic fragility). In both the United States (OCC) and Australia, 
however, regulators have been cautious in extending restricted licenses. In the UK, which has 
established a “new bank startup unit” and provided other mechanisms to help fintechs enter the 
banking business (see Appendix 3), actual licensing provisions seem not to have changed at all. 
In that jurisdiction, it appears that regulatory support is being used to help challenger banks – of 
which there are a number – meet existing licensing standards. 
There is a balance to be struck between ensuring competition in the banking sector, for 
consumers’ sake, and maintaining the safety and soundness standards that safeguard systemic 
stability and depository insurance. To the extent that fintech companies are able to circumvent 
OCC regulation in the United States because of that country’s fractured regulatory structure, 
while still having access to FDIC depository insurance, for example, there are risks. However, 
the choice of federal or state regulation is less important than ensuring that the financial 
institution in question remains subject to prudential and consumer protection requirements. The 
banking/commercial separation doctrine, as a component of OCC regulation, is less important 
today than the prudential standards to which deposit-taking institutions should remain subject.  
Particularly in the wake of the financial crisis, systemic stability considerations also suggest that 
banks, which enjoy the benefits associated with licensing and state support, should potentially be 
subject to prudential requirements that apply across all business lines and not only their banking 
arms. This has been the case in the UK, following the Basel II Capital Accord’s functional 
implementation into UK law. Under UK ring-fencing, the benefits associated with licensing and 
state support will be further targeted toward the explicit domestic deposit-taking and loan-
making traditional banking functions. By contrast, it does not seem that prudential regulatory 
standards are accomplishing the same goals in Australia, as a function of industry interpretation 
of the standards and regulatory acceptance of the status quo. 
Note that this report does not suggest that existing prudential regulatory standards, even 
interpreted in the comprehensive UK fashion, are necessarily sufficient to address new risks that 
may flow from banks engaging in commercial activity. As Japan’s FSA observed in June 2018, it 
will be necessary to update prudential regulations, and to consider the adequacy of existing 
safety nets, in order to accommodate the risks flowing from having banks engage in new types of 
business.48 The kinds of risks that are triggered by large-scale data-based businesses (of the kind 
the Australian banks may soon be contemplating) may be different in kind and in magnitude 
from what prudential standards currently contemplate. This report suggests, only, that using 
sufficiently robust prudential tools, which adequately cover a bank’s businesses, is more in line 
with evolving international practice, and is more principled and direct, than relying on the proxy 
of the banking/commercial separation doctrine to achieve the same regulatory goals. Clear 
regulatory guidance about the appropriate interpretation of prudential requirements vis-à-vis 
commercial businesses, along with explicit transparency and disclosure obligations, seem 
                                               
48 See supra note 36 and accompanying text; also see Appendix 3 below. 
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essential to ensuring that banks disclose, and provide for, all the risks they are running which 
may affect systemic stability and which may require state support in the form of LOLR 
assistance or deposit insurance. 
Existing transparency, governance, and risk governance mechanisms within corporate 
governance regimes may potentially go some distance to managing the risks associated with 
commercial or fintech activity by banks. In October 2018, Australia implemented a strong new 
regime in response to its recent banking scandals.49 Every jurisdiction discussed here has some 
corporate governance expectations that apply to financial institutions, although they may not all 
be equally meaningfully enforced in practice. Nevertheless, corporate governance provisions will 
not compensate for the absence of regulatory guidance around how to account for non-financial 
commercial businesses within a bank’s overall structure. 
2. Consumer protection: data and privacy, consumer protection and back-office 
concerns   
Given what we now know about how central data is to contemporary businesses – financial and 
non-financial – and given the vast data that banks have concerning their customers, protecting 
consumers requires that consumers themselves control access to their data, that they understand 
and consent to the uses to which it is being put, and that banks have effective systems in place to 
manage the operational and privacy risks that flow from their businesses. The 
banking/commercial separation doctrine is not responsive to this new consumer protection 
priority. Existing risk governance mechanisms within corporate governance help to address some 
of these risks. More comprehensively, as noted in Appendix 3, three of the five jurisdictions 
discussed in this report (the UK, Australia, and Japan – as well as the EU, which has taken the 
lead on this initiative) are in the process of implementing some form of Open Banking. 
Omnibus statutory duties of confidentiality and/or protection of privacy regimes may also be 
relevant. All the jurisdictions discussed here have personal privacy and data protection regimes 
in place, though they may not all be equally meaningful in practice. Among notable recent 
initiatives, Australia’s Productivity Commission has proposed a general “new data framework,” 
whose recommended statutory reforms are clearly relevant to fintech, banking, and personal 
financial information, even though these sectors are not explicitly mentioned. The Report has 
recommended that Australians have the benefit of a Consumer Data Right (CDR), a provision 
which has been adopted by government and which will be applied first to banking sector, 
through the Open Banking initiative, as of July 2019.50 
Whether consumer data protection rights are adopted through general statutory reforms or 
through regulation targeted at financial institutions, there is a need to develop updated consumer 
protection mechanisms, which go beyond what the banking/commercial separation doctrine can 
accomplish. 
                                               
49 See Austl, Commonwealth, APRA, Implementing the Banking Executive Accountability Regime (Information 
paper) (17 October 2018), online pdf: 
<https://www.apra.gov.au/sites/default/files/information_paper_implementing_the_bear.pdf>. 
50 Austl, Commonwealth, Productivity Commission, Data Availability and Use (Report No. 82) (Canberra: online, 8 




3. Promoting competition: addressing conflicts of interest and avoiding excessive 
market concentration 
Conflicts of interest would remain of concern in any situation where a bank was also in 
competition for business with non-bank businesses. Existing banking law provisions address 
conflicts of interest within the different financial arms of a universal financial institution.51 Tie-in 
arrangements in particular have long produced challenges and regulatory responses in adjacent 
areas, such as securities regulation. However, it does not seem that the specific conflict of 
interest concern that underpinned the banking/commercial separation doctrine has been 
comprehensively addressed in any of the jurisdictions reviewed here. That is, the prospect that a 
bank might withhold funding to a competitor in a commercial space, or might require that 
customers purchase their product to obtain a loan, seems not to have been considered within 
banking regulation itself. In the absence of the banking/commercial separation doctrine, specific 
provisions that clearly extend existing conflict of interest provisions to cover non-financial 
commercial businesses will be required. 
At the same time, it seems fair to say that banks’ conflicts of interest are not the only conflicts of 
interest that could affect customers’ and competitors’ access to funding today, just as banks are 
no longer the only source of financing. A comprehensive regulatory response to conflicts of 
interest beyond banking is beyond the scope of this report. Within the ambit of this project, 
banking regulators should ensure that they are alive to new conflicts of interest and 
anticompetitive behaviour within the industry, which arise as a function of new non-financial 
commercial business lines, and should ensure that existing banking law provisions are effectively 
enforced. 
Open Banking initiatives like those already underway in the EU, the UK, and Australia also help 
to promote competition and to prevent excessive concentration, and have been well-received by 
the public in those jurisdictions, perhaps especially in light of the perception that banks have 
abused their market power in some segments. 
Concluding Remarks 
Banks continue to be “special,” in the sense that they serve an important role in enabling the 
economy to function, and in the sense that because of that, they have access to special privileges. 
Licensing continues to be an important mechanism for linking those special privileges with a set 
of regulatory obligations, around prudential regulation in particular.  
The banking/commercial separation doctrine, however, may no longer be the ideal means for 
addressing the concerns – about systemic risk, and about customer protection – that generated it. 
Among the jurisdictions reviewed here, most have softened the doctrine. Properly implemented, 
prudential and governance requirements have the potential to do substantial work in ensuring 
systemic stability, protecting consumers, and promoting competition within the sector. Of 
course, as with any regulatory regime, those standards are open to interpretation, including 
potentially self-serving or short-termist interpretation by industry actors. In the absence of a 
banking/commercial separation doctrine or another limit like the UK’s ring-fencing initiative, 
                                               
51 See, e.g., Australia’s proposed APS 222, s. 11(a), which requires arm’s length dealings with a potential 
commercial subsidiary; also § 23A and 23B of the US Federal Reserve Act, which require all transactions between 
banks and their affiliates to be at arm's length. 
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and given the changing nature of the banking business, regulators will want to ensure that the 
disclosure / transparency and prudential requirements that apply to banks, and which give them 
access to special privileges such as LOLR liquidity support and deposit insurance, explicitly 
account for all the business risks, including non-financial commercial risks, the bank is running.  
In consumer protection terms, as well, by comparison to strategies like a comprehensive 
Consumer Data Right, the banking/commercial separation doctrine is ill-fitting and rigid. It risks 
both failing to meet its own regulatory purposes, and creating distortions in the market (e.g., 
because of a non-level playing field between banks and nonbanks). Rather than trying to protect 
consumers through the proxy of the banking/separation doctrine, it makes sense to address 
consumer protection, particularly around data, in a direct and explicit fashion. 
Concerns about systemic risk and consumer protection have not disappeared; far from it. 
However, where the will exists to both develop and adequately support more modern regulatory 
mechanisms, these concerns can now be addressed through potentially more effective means 
than the banking/commercial separation doctrine. 
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Appendix 1: Banking Licenses, and the “Business of Banking” Defined 
 
Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
Australia Per Banking Act 1959, s. 5, “banking business” means 
(a)  a business that consists of banking within the meaning of 
paragraph 51(xiii) of the Constitution [= “banking, other than State 
banking; also State banking extending beyond the limits of the State 
concerned, the incorporation of banks, and the issue of paper 
money”]; or 
(b)  a business that is carried on by a corporation to which 
paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution [= “foreign corporations, and 
trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the 
Commonwealth”] applies and that consists, to any extent, of: 
  (i)  both taking money on deposit (otherwise than as part-payment 
for identified goods or services) and making advances of money; or 
 (ii)  other financial activities prescribed by the regulations for the 
purposes of this definition. 
- Banking Regulation 2016 is the only relevant regulation, s. 
6 of which prescribes that the provision of “purchased 
payment systems” is banking business effectively if 
purchaser can demand payment is AUD and system is 
available on wide basis. 
Banks must be licensed as Authorised Deposit-taking Institution 
(ADI), through APRA.52  
 
Banking Act 1959: 
8  Only the Reserve Bank and bodies corporate that are ADIs 
may carry on banking business 
(1) A body corporate commits an offence if: 
(a) the body corporate carries on any banking business in 
Australia; and  
(b) the body corporate is not the Reserve Bank; and 
(c) the body corporate is not an ADI [Authorised Deposit-
taking Institution]; and 
(d) there is no determination in force under section 11 that 
this subsection does not apply to the body corporate 
[discretionary exemption powers to APRA] 
 
 
                                               
52 APRA also licenses inter alia building societies, credit unions, insurers under various other licenses, as well as non-operating holding companies (NOHCs) 
that carry on no other business than owning other bodies corporate. Other financial institutions (broker-dealers and investment advisors, finance companies) can 
operate under Australian Financial Services (AFS) License granted by ASIC. If engaging in credit activities (e.g., car loans, leases, businesses allowing 
customers to pay for goods by instalment, issuing mortgages), requires an Australian Credit License (ACL) also granted by ASIC. Full service banks, which also 





Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
- E.g., smart cards, digital assets, travelers cheques 9  Authority to carry on banking business 
(2) A body corporate which desires authority to carry on 
banking business in Australia may apply in writing to APRA for 
authority accordingly. 
Restricted ADI License53 effective May 2018, with goal to 
encourage competition while maintaining safety and stability, not 
disadvantaging incumbents 
• provides eligible applicants with a restricted licence for a 
maximum of two years before they must meet the [direct 
route license] prudential framework in full, so as to enable 
them to conduct limited banking business while developing 
their capabilities and resources. If they cannot get there in 
two years, must wind up. 
• Principles-based approach with ongoing guidance and 
support by APRA, taking into account applicant’s 
capabilities, resources, the limitations that will be imposed 
on size of its business during restricted period, the 
expectation that applicant engage in lower risk business 
during restricted period 
• Lower or simplified capital requirements, liquidity 
calculations, somewhat relaxed corporate governance and 
risk governance, risk management requirements – generally 
early stage business profile 
• Deposits are not fully protected under Australian 
Government Financial Claims Scheme (FCS, like CDIC) 
• Large tech firms are not likely eligible – are too large. 
Eligibility likely restricted to “new startups” and “small 
non-ADI SME lenders” (p. 23) 
                                               
53 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, “Information Paper: ADI licensing: Restricted ADI Framework”, (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, 
2018) [ARPA, “Restricted ADI Framework”].  
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Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
• Restricted license allows licensee to use the word “bank” in 
name; important signaling device. 
• Fairly comprehensive disclosure obligations re restricted 
nature of license, risks 
As of 20 December 2018, two banks54 have obtained: volt bank 
limited and Xinja Bank Limited. volt bank limited became a full, 
not-restricted ADI in January 2019.  
Japan Banking Act Article 255 
(1) The term "Bank" as used in this Act means a person that 
engages in Banking under a license from the Prime Minister as 
referred to in Article 4, paragraph (1).  
(2) The term "Banking" as used in this Act means the business of 
performing any of the following activities: 
(i) acceptance of deposits or Installment Savings, as well 
as the lending of funds or the discounting of bills and 
notes; or 
(ii) dealing in funds transfer transactions. 
(21) The term "Banking Services" as used in this Act means 
services that a Bank performs pursuant to the provisions of Article 
10 and Article 11 [discussed below], services that a Bank performs 
pursuant to the provisions of the Secured Corporate Bonds Trust 
Act [N/A] and other laws, and Bank Agency Services that a person 
engaged in Bank Agency Services performs for a Bank. 
Per Article 4(1), Prime Minister issues banking licenses. PM 
delegates responsibility for issuing licenses to the Financial Services 
Agency of Japan (JFSA). As in the United States Banks/BHCs can 
establish subsidiaries to engage in broader financial services (i.e., 
securities trading, broker-dealer services etc.), which requires 
separate licensing under Financial Instruments and Exchange Act.56   
                                               
54 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, “Register of authorised deposit-taking institutions” (2019), online: <www.apra.gov.au/register-authorised-deposit-
taking-institutions> [Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, “Register of ADIs”]. 
55 Banking Act, Act No 59 of June 1, 1981, as last amended by Act No 49 of 2017 [Japan Banking Act]. 




Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
Article 10 (1) A Bank may perform the following services: 
(i) acceptance of deposits and Installment Savings, etc.; 
(ii) the lending of funds and the discounting of bills and 
notes; and 
(iii) funds transfer transactions. 
(2) In addition to the services set forth in the items of the 
preceding paragraph, a Bank may perform the following services 
and any other services incidental to Banking: [detailed list of 
financial activities including guaranteeing obligations, accepting 
bills and notes, changing money, plus a range of securities-related 
matters: effecting their purchase and sale, lending securities, acting 
on a limited range of derivatives transactions specified by Cabinet 
Order – all of which plausibly fit into “incidental” matters and not 
actually securities business; definitely not non-financial commercial 
business. See also Article 33 of Financial Instruments and 
Exchange Act, which prohibits banks from engaging in securities 
business subject to, again, a set of detailed exceptions.]  
Article 11 In addition to the services it performs pursuant to the 
provisions of the preceding Article, a Bank may perform the 
following services, inasmuch as this does not interfere with the 
performance of the services set forth in the items of Article 10, 
paragraph (1): [investment advisory work, limited range of 
securities matters per Article 33 of Financial Instruments and 
Exchange Act, administering a trust, wrapping up a carbon 
emissions quota contract] 
Singapore Section 2 of the Banking Act57 defines “banking business” as “the 
business of receiving money on current or deposit account, paying 
and collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by customers, the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issues licenses. MAS 
seems to be quite hands-on, has tended to make case-by-case 
decisions on matters under Regulation 23G and generally. Per 
23G(6) of the Banking Regulation,58 “a bank in Singapore that 
                                               
57 Banking Act (Cap 19, 2008 Rev Ed Sing), s 2 [Singapore Banking Act]. 
58 Banking Regulations (Cap 19, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed Sing), r 23G(6) [Singapore Banking Regulations]. 
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Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
making of advances to customers, and includes such other business 
as the Authority may prescribe for the purposes of this Act”.  
Banking Act was modified in 2011 by Regulation 23G, which 
permitted activities that were “related or complementary” to banks’ 
core financial businesses. (Reportedly the provision was not used 
much; see Appendix 2 for further changes in 2017.) 
 
carries on any business prescribed in paragraph (1) shall comply with 
such other conditions or restrictions that the Authority [MAS] may 
impose, from time to time, by notice in writing in relation to its 
carrying on of such business”. 
United 
Kingdom 
General description in FSMA s. 22: 
(1) An activity is a regulated activity for the purposes of this Act if 
it is an activity of a specified kind which is carried on by way of 
business and— 
(a) relates to an investment of a specified kind; or 
(b) in the case of an activity of a kind which is also specified 
for the purposes of this paragraph, is carried on in relation 
to property of any kind. 
Further description is contained in Schedule 2 of the Act and in 
FSMA (Regulated Activities) Order 200159 (RAO). Because the UK 
has a unified prudential regulator with prudential regulatory 
jurisdiction over banking, securities and investments, and insurance 
(as well as benchmarks), Schedule 2 and the RAO include a full 
range of financial activities including accepting deposits (Chapter 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s. 19, imposes a general 
prohibition on carrying on “regulated activities” unless one is an 
“authorised person”. Persons are authorised under FSMA 2000 Part 
4A, “Permission to Carry on Regulated Activities”. PRA licenses 
banks (per s. 55A et seq.)62 with further “threshold provisions” 
around, e.g., legal status and location of offices, located in the Act’s 
Schedule 6, Part 1E. 
PRA and FCA have jointly established “new bank start-up unit”63 
and “new insurer start-up unit”64 to assist “challenger banks” in 
navigating the system. Unlike Australia, the UK has not instituted an 
entry-level or restricted bank/insurer license. However, see list65 
from May 2018 of “challenger banks,” virtually all digital with a 
range of business plans, which are at some stage of applying for 
banking licenses. 
                                               
59 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI, 2001/544.  
62 Full service financial institutions (pursuing “universal banking business model”) would also have to register with FCA. [Broader licensing for “provision of 
financial services” not covered here; more FCA’s concern than PRA’s.] 
63 Bank of England, “New Bank Start-up Unit”, (2019), online: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/new-bank-start-up-unit>. 
64 Prudential Regulatory Authority and Financial Conduct Authority, “New Insurer Start-up Unit: What you need to know from the PRA and the FCA” (London, 
2018).  





Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
2), consumer lending and regulated credit agreements, effecting and 
carrying out contracts of insurance, multiple investment-related 
powers incl. dealing as principal or agent, arranging deals, 
managing investments, advising; also specific kinds of financial 
products such as mortgages, funeral plan contracts.  
PRA Rulebook Glossary60 does not define banking but it defines 
“bank” to mean:  
(1) a firm with a Part 4A Permission to carry on the regulated 
activity of accepting deposits and is a credit institution, but 
is not a credit union, friendly society or a building society; 
or 
(2) an EEA bank. 
To be regulated, activities must be carried on in connection with 
“specified investments” incl deposits, e-money, insurance, shares 
and derivatives, generally other financial assets. (Suggests that 
some commercial business is not “regulated activity” even when 
undertaken by “authorised person.” However, once a firm is an 
authorised person, the FCA can make rules governing unregulated 
activity by that authorised person or by authorised persons in 
general: FCA, 30 Jan 2018.)61  
United States 
(federal) 
Per the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act: companies that control 
banks can only engage in the activities of managing or controlling 
banks unless an exception from the “nonbanking prohibitions” of 
the BHC Act applies. The exceptions permit activities that are 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), an independent 
bureau within Treasury, is primary national bank 
regulator/supervisor.  
                                               
60 Prudential Regulatory Authority, “PRA Rulebook: Glossary”, (2015), online: <www.prarulebook.co.uk/rulebook/Glossary/Rulebook/0/03-09-2015/B>. 





Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
“closely related to banking”, and certain passive and non-
controlling investments.66  
Definitions: 
“bank” = (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) [exceptions for 
foreign banks, some state-level savings institutions, institutions that 
function solely in a trust or fiduciary capacity and that effectively 
do not engage in depository banking], the term “bank” means any 
of the following:  
(A) An insured bank as defined [by the FDIC],  
(B) An institution organized under the laws of the United States, 
any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, any 
territory of the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American 
Samoa, or the Virgin Islands which both—  
(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may 
withdraw by check or similar means for payment to third parties or 
others; and  
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans. 
Has established a Responsible Innovation Office,69 which has 
developed “special purpose national bank charters”70 for fintech 
firms (considering applications from 31 July 2018), Per the press 
release:  
• “The OCC will consider applications from fintech 
companies to charter a special purpose national bank that 
would engage in one or more of the “core banking 
activities” of paying checks or lending money but would not 
take deposits and would not be insured by the FDIC. The 
OCC stated that a qualified fintech company that receives a 
special purpose national bank charter will be subject to the 
same high standards of safety and soundness and fairness 
that all federally chartered banks must meet, and will be 
supervised like similarly situated national banks, including 
with respect to capital, liquidity, and risk management. …  
• Fintech companies that apply and qualify for, and receive, 
special purpose national bank charters will be supervised 
like similarly situated national banks, to include capital, 
liquidity, and financial inclusion commitments as 
appropriate [among other requirements] … New fintech 
                                               
66 Broader category of Financial Holding Company, FHC, subject to higher management and capital requirements, is full service institution with insurance and 
securities and “merchant banking” capacities It is not a bank or a bank holding company. FHCs could get case-by-case approval to engage in “complementary” 
activities, had a grandfathered ability to engage in commodity trading, and had the ability, through their merchant banking arms, to invest in virtually any non-
financial interest. For a comprehensive review, see Saule T. Omarova, “The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities” (2013) 98:1 
Minn L Rev 265. In September 2016, a joint report to Congress and the FSOC prepared by the Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the FDIC advised Congress to 
repeal FHCs’ ability to engage in merchant banking activities, and to significantly limit their ability to engage in grandfathered and “complementary” activities. 
The report is unlikely to produce results during the current US presidential administration. In any event, merchant banking is distinct from “banking” as 
discussed in this report. (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et. Al., Report to the Congress and the Financial Stability Oversight Council Pursuant to 
Section 620 of the Dodd-Frank Act (Washington: 2016).  
69 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Responsible Innovation”, online: <www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/index-innovation.html>. 
70 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, News Release, “OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology 




Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
A Bank Holding Company may also engage directly in, or 
establish or acquire subsidiaries that engage in, nonbanking 
activities determined by the Federal Reserve Board to be closely 
related to banking (e.g., mortgage banking, consumer and 
commercial finance and loan servicing, leasing, collection agency, 
asset management, trust company, real estate appraisal, financial 
and investment advisory activities, management consulting, 
employee benefits consulting, career counseling services, and 
certain insurance-related activities). See Federal Reserve Manual at 
§3000 et seq., nonbank activities.67 
A Bank (meaning not its holding company), per OCC, may engage 
in activities that are “incidental to banking”, initially published by 
way of No-Action Letters and compiled into Comptroller’s 
Licensing Manual68 (2017). Permits banks to have subsidiaries 
engaging in businesses that provide services incidental to their 
banking business: incl. holding assets, offering internal day-to-day 
operational services to the bank, lending and credit activities, 
management consulting advice for other banks, providing fairly 
extensive range of data-processing, data warehousing and data 
transmission products, services, and related activities and facilities, 
including associated equipment and technology” for the bank itself 
(pp. 36-37), plus securities-related activities (underwriting, 
investment advising, broker-dealer services etc.), acting as a 
website host (p. 55), provide or sell electronic data- processing and 
data-transmission services, databases, and facilities (p. 61); acting 
“as a digital certification authority”, issuing digital certificates and 
acting as a repository of public keys and certificate information.. … 
may also provide connected data-processing services and may sell 
or rent equipment, … provide consulting or advisory services to 
help customers, including other banks, to implement digital 
companies that become special purpose national banks will 
be subject to heightened supervision initially, similar to 
other de novo banks. 
 
 
Industrial Loan Companies (ILCs) and Innovation at the 
Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC): 
FDIC is concurrent regulator for national banks (in regard to 
depository insurance), primary federal regulator for state banks 
(whose deposits they also insure). Virtually all commercial banks in 
US must be insured by FDIC 
• July 2018 announcement re FDIC setting up an “office of 
innovation” to encourage banks to adopt fintech strategies 
(with eye to helping smaller banks with fewer resources 
remain competitive) 
• Per Chair McWilliams, October 2018,71 “FDIC could 
encourage innovation in three ways: The first is through the 
industrial loan company, a specialized banking charter 
supervised by the FDIC; the second way would be through 
the FDIC’s regulation of banks’ third-party vendor 
relationships; and the third is by working with tech 
companies to obtain improved processing, service and 
efficiency at banks”  
• Industrial Loan Companies (ILCs): 
                                               
67 United States, Federal Reserve, Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual, (Washington: 2017) at s 3000.  
68 United States, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Controller’s Licensing Manual: Subsidiaries and Equity Investments, (Washington: 2019).  




Jurisdiction Definition of banking business 
Licensing body and terms 
(bear in mind that licensing bodies may always impose conditions or 
restrictions on individual banking licenses) 
signature systems.” Banks can also own non-controlling equity 
stakes in loan, lease, reporting, and credit-related businesses 
including credit cards, payment services, data processing and 
correspondent services (pp. 66-67), real estate, insurance, securities 
 
o Controversial: a bank charter that allows 
companies to own a bank w/o having to comply 
with Bank Holding Company Act requirements.  
o Deposits insured by FDIC.  
o Available in 9 states, with Utah being dominant  
o Apparently of interest to fintechs that want to offer 
fuller range of services including taking deposits: 
student online lender SoFi72 applied then withdrew 
application, 2017; Square applied then withdrew, 
but claims continued intention to become ILC   
 
                                               
72 Ainsley Harris, “Are you ready to ditch your bank? SoFi is betting its future on it”, Fast Company (19 June 2018), online: 
<www.fastcompany.com/40585328/are-you-ready-to-ditch-your-bank-sofi-is-betting-its-future-on-it> [Harris, “Are you ready to ditch your bank?”]. 
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Appendix 2: The banking/commercial separation doctrine and caps on non-financial ownership 
 
Jurisdiction Caps on non-financial ownership? Formal banking/commercial separation doctrine? 
Japan Yes  
2016 Banking Act amendments (in effect April 1, 2017): 
Under Banking Act Article 16-4, banks could formerly not hold 
more than 5% voting rights in any non-financial company; for 
BHCs the limit was 15%. Limits are now lifted, again subject to 
JFSA approval, for new kinds of subsidiaries as described in 
Banking Act Article 16-2(xii, xii-2, xii-3)73 
Yes 
Banking Act74 Article 12 A Bank may not do business other than that 
which it does pursuant to the provisions of the preceding two Articles 
and that which it does pursuant to the provisions of the Secured 
Bonds Trust Act [N/A here] or other laws.   
Singapore Yes 
Per 2017 Consultation Paper on the Anti-Commingling Policy,75 
s. 3.2, dealing with permissible non-financial businesses under 
regulation 23G, the “aggregate size of all businesses carried on by 
the bank under regulation 23G [must] not exceed 10% of the 
bank’s capital funds (solo and group)” 
For any other businesses a bank acquires, which are not 
permissible non-financial businesses under regulation 23G,  
• s. 31 of the Banking Act prescribes a single equity 
investment limit of 2% of the bank’s capital funds.  
• s. 32 of the Banking Act requires MAS approval for 
acquisition of a major (<10%) stake in an entity. 
Yes but softening 
An “anti-commingling policy” separating financial and non-financial 
businesses of banks in Singapore was established in 2001. It was 
modified in 2011 by Regulation 23G, which permitted activities that 
were “related or complementary” to their core financial businesses. 
Regulation 23G reportedly not used much; new 2017 Consultation 
Paper has clarified and “streamlined” provisions, seemingly with 
changing technology and the changing nature of banking in mind, 
including “matching buyers and sellers of consumer goods”. 2011 
Regulation 23G and 2017 Consultation Paper described below 
                                               
73            (xii) a company specified by Cabinet Office Order as one that is developing a new business field [additional detail here]  
(xii)-2 a company that performs new business activities that are found to contribute considerably to the improvement of management [additional 
detail]; 
(xii)-3 beyond what is set forth in the preceding items, a company that performs services that contribute or are expected to contribute to the advanced 
Banking conducted by the Bank or the enhanced convenience of users of the Bank by utilizing technology including information and telecommunication 
technology; 
74 Japan Banking Act, supra note 37 at art 12.  
75 Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Review of Anti-Commingling Framework for Banks (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2017) at para 2.1 




Jurisdiction Caps on non-financial ownership? Formal banking/commercial separation doctrine? 
United States 




BHCs can make investments in companies not engaged in 
activities closely related to banking, but these investments cannot 
exceed 5 percent of the target company's outstanding voting 
stock.76 
Yes: see Appendix 1 
Australia No, however must give notice to APRA of intentions beyond 
threshold of 20% in acquisition / 10% of exposure 
Per APRA’s current 2015 APS 222, Associations with Related 
Entities, para 31, ADIs “must consult with APRA before: … 
committing to any proposal to acquire (whether directly or 
indirectly) more than 20 per cent of equity interest in an entity” 
Proposed APS 222 (which may come into force January 1, 
2020), para 37: 
An ADI must notify APRA prior to: … 
(b) committing to any proposal to acquire (whether directly or 
indirectly) more than 20 per cent of equity interest in an entity; 
and 
(c) committing to any proposed exposure to a related entity that is 
greater than, or equal to, 10 per cent of the ADI’s Tier 1 Capital.  
No (twin peaks regime) 
United Kingdom No 
EU Directive 2006/48/EC Article 120 imposes a 15% ownership 
cap for own funds, but this provision was not transposed into UK 
law.77 
 No (twin peaks regime) 
 
 
                                               
76 Federal Reserve System, “Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies”, online: Partnership for Progress <www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-
cycle/grow-shareholder-value/bank-holding-companies> 




Appendix 3: High-level review of select legislative and regulatory changes 
Australia 
Australia, like Canada, has a concentrated banking sector. Its banking market is largely controlled by four major banks: National 
Australia Bank (NAB); Commonwealth Bank (CBA); Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ); Westpac (WBC). Recent 
scandals have badly undermined the credibility of Australia’s market conduct and consumer protection regulator, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). Australia’s prudential regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA), was not directly implicated. Nevertheless, the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and 
Financial Services Industry78 produced a scathing report on misconduct in the banking, investment, insurance, and superannuation 
markets. Its final report was made public in February 2019. Among other things, it identified a lack of competition within financial 
markets, combined with regulatory laxity, as contributing factors. 
Australia’s Productivity Commission, analogous to our Competition Bureau, issued a strongly worded critique in its Inquiry Report 
on Competition in Australian Financial System79 (June 2018). The Commission took note of Australian large banks’ and insurers’ 
market power and the concentration of the industry, and criticized opaque pricing practices, poor advice, regulatory shortcomings, 
and poor consumer outcomes. It recommended that Australia take explicit steps to promote greater competition. Based on a series of 
detailed examinations into the structures on which the banking business relies, it saw limited evidence that, in the absence of 
regulatory change, foreign banks, fintechs, or large tech companies were actually in a position to offset banks’ current market power. 
Australia 
Banking Licenses: Restricted ADI License80 (as with proposed US OCC restricted license) effective May 2018, with goal to encourage competition while 
maintaining safety and stability, not disadvantaging incumbents 
• provides eligible applicants with a restricted licence for a maximum of two years before they must meet the [direct route license] prudential framework 
in full, so as to enable them to conduct limited banking business while developing their capabilities and resources. If they cannot get there in two years, 
must wind up. 
• Principles-based approach with ongoing guidance and support, taking into account applicant’s capabilities, resources, the limitations that will be 
imposed on size of its business during restricted period, the expectation that applicant engage in lower risk business during restricted period 
                                               
78 Australia, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, Final Report (Canberra: 2019). 
79 Australia, Productivity Commission, Productivity Commission, Competition in the Australian Financial System, Inquiry Report (Canberra: 2018).  





o APRA provides ongoing guidance incl early contact in pre-application stage, several meetings (incl. with IT specialists if needed) to develop 
application 
o Lower or simplified capital requirements, liquidity calculations, somewhat relaxed corporate governance and risk governance, risk 
management requirements – generally early stage business profile 
• Deposits are not fully protected under Australian Government Financial Claims Scheme (FCS, like CDIC) 
• Large tech firms are not likely eligible – are too large. Eligibility likely restricted to “new startups” and “small non-ADI SME lenders” (p. 23) 
• Restricted license allows licensee to use the word “bank” in name; important signaling device. 
• Fairly comprehensive disclosure obligations re restricted nature of license, risks 
• As of 20 December 2018, two banks81 have obtained: volt bank limited and Xinja Bank Limited. volt bank limited became a full, unrestricted ADI in 
January 2019. 
Proposed APS 222 (coming into force January 1, 2020): 
• See discussion in main body of report: unclear whether consolidation, prudential, and reporting requirements would cover all “related entities”, 
including those that are not counterparties  
Payment Systems (includes ATM system, credit card debit systems (Visa and MC), Paypal): primary oversight and regulation of payments system falls under 
the Reserve Board of Australia’s jurisdiction but need ADI license from APRA to engage in “banking business”82. 
Purchased payment facility, as part of banking business, must comply with prudential requirements (minimal capital adequacy, liquidity and asset requirements) 
and have in place systems to manage operational risk. As of 20 Dec 2018 (see link above), PayPal is only standalone licensed provider of purchased payment 
facilities  
Amendments83 to Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998 (the FSSA), passed and assented to 29 Nov 2018: 
• increasing from 15% to 20% the ownership limit that can be sought in a financial sector company without having to seek approval from the Treasurer; 
and 
                                               
81 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, “Register of ADIs”, supra note 36.  
82 Overview of structure as of 2011 from BIS. (Bank for International Settlement, Payment, clearing and settlement systems in Australia, (Committee on 
Payments and Market Infrastructure, 2011).  






• a new streamlined FSSA approval path for owners to hold (or invest) more than 20% in a new or recently established financial sector company provided 
the investors meet a “fit and proper” test and comply with asset requirements and ongoing conditions. 
Partnerships with fintech companies, or fintech investments by “big four” banks, seem extensive (per KPMG,84 Westpac Wire,85 NAB,86 CommBank,87 ANZ88) 
• links do not present comprehensive overview – investments seem to go into tens and even hundreds of millions (direct investment or lines of credit for 
fintech startups, sometimes in concert with other banks such as ING) 
Open Banking initiative 
• phased in from July 2019, based on Consumer Data Right as recommended by Productivity Commission in 2017. Banking is first sector subject to 
CDR, with telecom and energy likely to follow next 
• “The CDR gives Australians the right to move their data around, making it easier to access your data – such as the financial information your bank has 
on you – and share this with other businesses. This open data environment is expected to ramp up competition and allow consumers to negotiate better 
deals and save money” per Choice,89 consumer advocacy group 
• Removes banks’ informational advantage relative to fintechs, e.g., allowing fintechs to offer lower interest rate credit cards, P2P lending platforms, 
SME short term loans 
• Customers must provide explicit consent for sharing data, can direct banks to share data with anyone incl. competitors.  
• Risk mitigating initiatives being introduced include creation of new Data Standards Body to set standards for transfer, security, data; Accreditation 
requirement on entities that receive and send data; fact that data must be shared through an API, “championed by experts as the most efficient and 
secure way to share data with third parties” 
                                               
84 Elizabeth Barry, “KPMG: Australian banks leading on fintech innovation”, (2017), online: <www.finder.com.au/kpmg-australian-banks-leading-fintech-
innovation>.  
85 Guy Thursby, “Let’s do lunch: fintechs, banks and future,” (2018), online: <www.westpac.com.au/news/in-depth/2018/06/lets-do-lunch-fintechs-banks-and-
future/>. 
86 James Eyers & Clancy Yeates, “NAB Ventures created to invest $50m in fintech”, (2015), online: <www.afr.com/markets/nab-ventures-created-to-invest-
50m-in-fintech-20150729-gin0tg>. 
87 Commonwealth Bank of Australia, “Our Innovation Labs”, (2019), online: <www.commbank.com.au/about-us/innovation-lab.html>. 
88 Brenda Chai, “ANZ Joins Digital Trade Distribution Platform, Ccrmanager”, (2018), online: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group < 
institutional.anz.com/insight-and-research/ANZ-joins-digital-trade-distribution-platform-CCRManager>. 






• Implementation phased in by product and nature of entity (“big four” banks going first) between July 2019 and July 2021.  
Wholesale payments, settlement, clearing regime 
New Payments Platform90 and fast settlement service. Per Productivity Commission 2018 report @29-30: 
“The New Payments Platform (NPP) requires an access regime. … The NPP, which became operational in early 2018, is set to replace the current 
technology through which over $1 trillion moves between banks each month. It was set up, and is mutually owned, by 13 initial shareholder participants 
(including the major banks and the RBA). Regulators should act now to facilitate fair access to the NPP in its early days — which will likely determine 
whether the platform will become a hotbed for innovation and competition, or yet another payment system subject to the market power of incumbents.  
“The NPP is expected to reduce technical barriers for new financial institutions to enter the payments system, and enable existing institutions to provide 
more efficient services through real time transfers of funds. It provides a rich set of payment data, which could be used by fintechs and incumbents alike 
to develop new applications. … the RBA should establish a formal access regime for the NPP.  
  
                                               




Japan has made decisive moves to allow banks to engage in fintech, and there is evidence that it is considering a move toward more cross-
sectorial, purpose-oriented regulation; i.e., to move away from the entity-based regulatory regime that exists in Canada and the US. Japan 
has made clear moves to allow banks to engage in a broader range of services, including crowdfunding and creating digital currencies, etc. 
These activities are still pretty much entirely within the scope of “financial activities,” however, and do not stray into purely “commercial” 
businesses.91 The FSB’s peer review of Japan,92 in 2016, identified some concerns around macroprudential regulation and inter-agency 
coordination. 
Japan 
2016 Banking Act Amendments (in force 1 April 2017) 
• heightened risk management, governance, and disclosure obligations on bank holding companies or parent banks in regard to all subsidiaries and components 
• new ability to aggregate operational services across group – e.g., beyond just managing subs, BHC can now develop systems, negotiate leases, conduct R&D 
and wholesale product development, etc. for all companies within the BHC (at least one of which must be a “bank”) 
• relaxation of income dependency provisions: subs engaged in “Ancillary Business” no longer need to earn 50% of revenues from within the BHC [“Ancillary” 
very similar list to “incidental” business under Banking Act Article 10(2), described above under definition of “banking”] 
• relaxation of arm’s length rule: companies within a banking group can transact with each other not at arm’s length, subject to disclosure obligations, JFSA 
approval, and so long as transaction is not likely to affect banking group’s soundness 
• new fintech investment scope: Per Banking Act Article 16-4, banks could formerly not hold more than 5% voting rights in any non-financial company; for 
BHCs the limit was 15%. Limits are now lifted, again subject to JFSA approval, for new kinds of subsidiaries as described in Banking Act Article 16-2(xii, xii-
2, xii-3)93 
• foreign banks can now obtain group-wide, not individual sub-level, permission for bank agency and intermediary services 
                                               
91 One potential exception may be the intention of Japan’s largest bank, MUFG, to leverage its real estate business, which until now had been separately operated and 
which has a real estate broker’s license. Its Annual Report 2018 at p. 16 may suggest that it is contemplating some beyond-finance activities in the areas of “property 
appraisals, tenant leasing, custody, asset management and brokerage, and property management.” (Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, “MUFG Report 2018 (JGAAP)”, 
(Japan: 2018))  
92 Financial Stability Board, Peer Review of Japan (Financial Stability Board, 2016).  
93            (xii) a company specified by Cabinet Office Order as one that is developing a new business field [additional detail here if needed]  
(xii)-2 a company that performs new business activities that are found to contribute considerably to the improvement of management [additional detail]; 
(xii)-3 beyond what is set forth in the preceding items, a company that performs services that contribute or are expected to contribute to the advanced Banking 





2017 Banking Act Amendments (beginning to come into force June 2018, with grace period for some provisions) aimed at “promoting appropriate cooperation and 
collaboration between financial institutions and finance-related IT companies as well as to ensure user protection, in response to rapid IT development and its impact on 
financial services.”94 
Note: according to this95, “Japan's current banking laws do not let the financial institutions themselves take part in such operations as digital payments and e-
commerce”; therefore presumably they must partner with PSPs 
Provisions for open API and Electronic Service Provider regulation, seem equivalent to PSD2 in EU 
• Electronic service providers96 must now be registered, undertake disclosure (subject to some exemptions where risks to service users considered lower)97. Must 
enter into contract with banks to provide payment services, including risk management provisions 
• Banks must establish standards for contracts with payment services providers (around e.g., risk); cannot discriminate against non-bank PSPs 
• Banks that want to work with PSPs must make efforts to develop Open API platform within two years of amendments 
New JFSA Policy document 
June 2018 interim discussion paper [no concrete outcomes yet, unclear if/how this will proceed) on move away from entity-based regulatory framework toward 
more “function-based, cross-sectoral” regulation “in light of unbundling and rebundling …  to apply the same rules to activities with the same functions and risks” 
                                               
94 Financial Services Agency, Press Release, “FAQ of the Fintech Support Desk of FSA: Open API and Electronic Payment Services”, (14 December 2015), online: 
<www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2018/20180717.html>. 
95 Nikkei Asian Review, “Japan looks to jump-start fintech with legal overhaul”, (October 13, 2017), online: <asia.nikkei.com/Business/Banking-Finance/Japan-looks-
to-jump-start-fintech-with-legal-overhaul>. 
96 An “electronic payment service” means the services utilizing IT such as: 
(i)  A service that enables money transfers to multiple accounts per request with one click; and 
(ii) A service that automatically creates and keeps a household account book by obtaining and aggregating account information including account balance and 
transaction records from banks 
[aka “EDIs”, electronic data interchange, or “TPPs”, third party providers, or e-commerce – mechanisms such as credit cards, Paypal, Apple Pay, mobile money wallets, 
etc. for making payments online] 
97            (1) Transmission of settlement instructions conducted for the purpose of making periodical payments from a depositor to a particular person 
(2) Transmission of settlement instructions conducted for the purpose of money transfer from a depositor to the depositor’ own account 
(3) Transmission of settlement instructions conducted for the purpose of making payments from a depositor to the national and local governments 
(4) Transmission of settlement instructions conducted by (i) a depositor’s counterparty to sales contracts on goods and services or (ii) the counterparty’s agent, 





(Summary document98 available in English, of Interim Note by the Study Group on the Financial System under the Financial System Council, Japan. Underlying report 
available in Japanese only). Notes, inter alia, 
“4 Approach to entity-based regulations (i.e. regulations on scope of permissible business, safety nets, etc.) under the function-based, cross-sectoral financial 
regulations  
- Amid blurring boundaries between financial services and non-financial services, banks and banking groups are subject to strict entity-based regulations (i.e. 
regulations on scope of permissible business, prudential regulations, safety nets, etc.)  
• There is room to reconsider the focus placed on regulations on scope of permissible business of banks and banking groups  
• Regulations on scope of permissible business should be reviewed so that groups with the top-tier company being bank holding companies (i.e. value of 
shares of subsidiaries accounts for more than 50% of total assets), banks, and other business companies can compete on an equal footing basis, with 
attention to the differences in the effectiveness of avoiding risk in other business to the basic lines of business of banks  
• Considering possible changes in the scope of business that conventional banking groups are expected to engage in, broad-ranging studies will be necessary 
to update prudential regulations which accommodate risks of new types of business  
• It will be necessary to consider whether objectives and coverage of safety nets may change, and effective methods will need to be considered accordingly 
“5 Approach to rules for the process of providing products and services  
- Harmonization of rules for the process of providing products / services such as intermediary and agency services will be important so as not to hinder the 
cross-sector, cross-function provision of products / services which meets user needs  
- Considering possible changes in the structure of financial networks, it will be important to consider appropriate rules for platform providers (those that match 
parties to contracts in financial transactions), rather than regulating platform users (parties to the contracts), for effective implementation” 
  
                                               





Singapore is taking steps to become a fintech hub not only in banking but in finance generally. Singapore’s unified financial regulator, the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), has permitted banks to engage in business lines that are “adjacent” to its core businesses since 
2011, when it promulgated its Regulation 23G. In 2017, it provided further guidance in an “Anti-Commingling Consultation Paper,” 
discussed below, which would expand the scope of activities that banks can engage in. A high level of government control over the economy 
in Singapore perhaps explains certain idiosyncrasies (e.g., the prohibition on banks engaging in property development work – in Singapore, 
70% of residential properties belong to public housing program). Notably, as well, the FSB’s 2018 peer report identifies concerns around 
systemic risk in relation to Singapore’s commitment to fostering fintech in its jurisdiction. 
 
Singapore 
2011 Regulation 23G 
The pre-existing 2001 “anti-commingling policy” was intended to help banks remain focused on their core banking business and competencies, and avoid 
potential contagion from the conduct of non-financial businesses. The general thrust was to prohibit banks from:  
(a) directly undertaking businesses other than banking business and financial businesses99;  
(b) acquiring major stakes in companies engaging in non-financial businesses100; and  
(c) using or sharing their names, logos or trademarks on or with (i) physical infrastructure; (ii) sponsored events; or (iii) any non-financial affiliate101. (Para 2.1 
of the 2017 Consultation Paper102)  
Regulation 23G:  
In 2011, regulation 23G103 of the Banking Regulations was introduced, giving banks flexibility to carry on businesses that are related or complementary to their 
core financial businesses. (para 2.2 of the 2017 Consultation Paper104)  
                                               
99 Singapore Banking Act, supra note 39 at s 30.  
100 Ibid at s 32.  
101 Ibid at s 5A.  
102 Monetary Authority of Singapore, “Anti-Commingling”, supra note 75. 
103 Singapore Banking Regulations, supra note 40 at r 23G.  





o allows banks to carry on businesses “that are related or complementary to the bank’s core financial business but which may not be clearly financial,” 
without the need for prior prescription by class or specific approval on a case-by-case basis by MAS, subject to certain conditions, limits and 
requirements. (para 2.1 of 23G and 7A Guideline105)  
o Clearly non-financial businesses continue to be prohibited. (para 1.4 of the 2010 Consultation Paper106)  
“Regulation [now 23G, formerly 23F] widens the permissible businesses beyond those that are strictly financial and incidental to financial and allow 
businesses which are more broadly related or complementary to the core financial business of the bank. These businesses should support the bank’s financial 
businesses and should not be unrelated to the core financial business of the bank. …  – the bank has to show a connection between the businesses and the core 
financial business of the bank. … Whether a business is considered related or complementary to the core financial business of a bank depends in part on the 
business model of the bank.” (2010 Consultation Paper107 at p. 12, my emphasis)   
Other conditions:  
• Inter alia, “the businesses must already be carried on by a regulated financial institution in any jurisdiction, and permitted under the laws of that 
jurisdiction and by the supervisory authority of the financial institution. The businesses also have to be allowed by the parent supervisory authority of 
the bank, under the laws of the home jurisdiction of the bank. (para 2.4 of 23G and 7A Guideline108)  
• Must obtain prior approval from their parent supervisory authorities – proposed to be revised, below 
• [also engage external auditors, stress tests, reporting requirements to MAS, other governance] 
• some businesses such as property development, provision of hotel and resort facilities, and sale of consumer goods, are strictly prohibited (regulation 
23G(1)(e).109 (para 2.2 of the 2017 Consultation Paper110)  
 2017 Anti-Commingling Consultation Paper  
[seems more like a policy paper and includes specific guidance; no apparent follow-up or formal changes to Regulation 23G are yet publicly available]  
June 2017, MAS announced intention to refine the anti-commingling framework for banks in two key aspects:  
                                               
105 Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Guidelines on Banking Regulations 23G and 7A (Monetary Authority of Singapore, 2011) at para 2.1 [Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, “23G and 7A Guidelines”].  
106 Singapore, Monetary Authority of Singapore, Proposed Regulations to Allow Businesses Related or Complementary to Core Financial Business (Monetary Authority 
of Singapore, 2010) at para 1.4.  
107 Ibid at 12.  
108 Monetary Authority of Singapore, “23G and 7A Guidelines”, supra note 86 at para 2.4.  
109 Singapore Banking Regulations, supra note 40 at r 23G(1)(e).  





(a) The conditions and requirements under regulation 23G will be streamlined so as to make it easier for banks to conduct or invest in permissible 
non-financial businesses that are related or complementary to their core financial businesses; (for full discussion, see response to the question 
regarding supervision below) and  
(b) Banks will be allowed to engage in the operation of digital platforms that match buyers and sellers of consumer goods or services, as well as the 
online sale of such goods or services. (para 2.5 of the 2017 Consultation Paper111)  
Two main revisions planned to the list of prohibited non-financial businesses outlined in the current Regulation 23G(1)(e) (para 4.2):  
a) Banks will no longer be strictly prohibited from carrying on the business of selling consumer goods (currently prohibited by 23G(1)(e)(ii)) 
b) Banks will only be allowed to engage in property management for properties held by the bank or an entity in its banking group. (i.e. its subsidiary or 
any other entity treated as part of the bank’s group for accounting purposes according to the Accounting Standards) (relating to the current provision 
of 23G(1)(e)(iv))  
To “enable banks to compete effectively against the non-financial players in the new digital economy,” MAS proposes to allow banks to engage, directly or 
indirectly, in the following businesses, under regulation 23G (para 4.4): 
(a) Operation of online location or electronic platform that matches buyers and sellers of consumer goods or services;  
(b) Sale of consumer goods or services via online location or electronic platforms; and 
(c) Any business which is incidental to the business set out in paragraph (a) or (b) above e.g. the provision of logistics services to deliver the goods to 
consumers.  
The exact language of proposed provisions is in Annex E, F and G of the 2017 Consultation Paper112 at pp. 25-37.  
Following MAS’ announcement on the streamlined anti-commingling framework, some banks have also provided feedback that they would like to be able to 
conduct or invest in certain businesses, “as part of their strategy to provide integrated solutions to their customers”. MAS has said that it is prepared to allow 
banks to conduct these activities, so long as conditions under revised Regulation 23G are complied with (para 4.7-4.8 of the 2017 Consultation Paper113):   
(a) sale of software or systems that were originally developed or commissioned by the bank for its core financial business (e.g. sale of accounting or 
risk analytics software); and  
(b) entering into tie-ups or referral arrangements with any person for that person to sell or provide the person’s products or services which that person 
will be solely responsible for delivering or performing.  
                                               
111 Ibid. at para 2.5.  
112 Ibid. at 25-37.  





Another important measurement is the aggregate size of a bank’s non-financial business. MAS proposes to set the condition that the aggregate size of all 
businesses carried on by the bank under regulation 23G does not exceed 10% of the bank’s capital funds (solo and group). (para 3.2 of the 2017 Consultation 
Paper114) [more detail on calculating aggregate size in the Consultation paper] 
Reporting changes: under 2011 Regulation 23G, quarterly and annual reports were required. Under proposed 2017 provisions, only quarterly reports required 
(pp. 21-23), disclosure of balance sheet, revenue numbers, and exposure of all businesses that would fall under new Regulation 23G [more detail available if 
needed]. Also must give MAS advance notice of intention to conduct new business, not provide indemnities, engage in appropriate risk management, more.   
However,  
• MAS proposes to remove the requirement for banks to seek prior parent supervisory approval. (emphasis mine) (For the avoidance of doubt, a foreign 
bank should still seek its parent supervisory authority’s approval if this is a requirement imposed on the bank in its home jurisdiction.) (para 3.2) 
Still room for case-by-case review. Any businesses that do not fall within above limits require advance MAS approval, because “banks should not be engaging 




                                               




Taiwan’s banking industry is unlike the others considered here. It has an “under-concentrated” banking sector, characterized by excessive 
competition, low profit levels, no economies of scale, and reportedly long-term unsustainability in financial positions.115 Some of Taiwan’s 
largest domestic banks are still state-owned banks, which survived privatization efforts in the 1980s and 1990s. No domestic bank has more 
than 10% market share. In response, Taiwan has made efforts to promote mergers and to reach out to other potential depositors 
internationally. At least on paper, its integrated financial regulator, the Financial Supervisory Authority, seems to have substantial oversight 
powers. Taiwan’s first experiment under its new Experimentation Act, below, is interesting: it is a joint effort between a bank and a telecom 




Financial Technology Development and Innovative Experimentation Act (2018) 
Article 1: This Act is enacted for the purpose of creating a safe environment for experimentation involving innovative financial technologies (referred to as “innovative 
experimentation” hereunder) to develop technology-based innovative financial products or services, facilitate the development of inclusive financial systems and 
financial technologies, and put into effect the protection of innovative experimentation participants (referred to as the “participants” hereunder) and financial 
consumers. 
Article 3: “innovative experimentation” is “utilizing technological innovation or business model innovation to undertake experimentation of financial businesses [term 
not defined] that requires the permission, approval or concession of the competent authority”.  
Article 7: To promote the innovation and development of financial technology and to uphold public interest, the competent authority should, when reviewing an 
innovative experimentation application, consider the following based on the scope, duration and scale of the proposed innovative experimentation:  
1. Whether the experimentation involves financial businesses that require the permission, approval or concession of the competent authority; 
2. Whether the experimentation is innovative; 
3. Whether the experimentation can effectively increase the efficiency of financial services, reduce operational and use costs or enhance the interests of 
financial consumers and enterprises; 
4. Whether potential risks have been assessed and relevant response measures prepared; 
5. Whether participant protection measures have been established and appropriate compensation prepared; and 
6. Other matters that should be evaluated. 
Article 9: The period of innovative experimentation approved by the competent authority shall be limited to one year [with opportunity to apply for extension]. 
                                               
115 As of April 2018, Taiwan had 38 domestic banks (with 3,411 branch offices), 29 local branches of foreign and mainland China banks, 23 credit cooperatives, 283 





Article 17: Where an innovative experimentation is inventive, effectively increase the efficiency of financial services, reduce operational and use costs or enhance the 
interests of financial consumers and enterprises, the competent authority should take the following actions in consideration of the implementation status of the 
innovative experimentation: 
1. Reviewing and revising relevant financial regulations. 
2. Providing assistance to the applicant in starting a business or entering into strategic cooperation [with relevant organization]. 
3. Making referrals to relevant government agencies (institutions) or organizations or funds that offer business startup assistance. 
If it is decided by the competent authority that relevant financial laws should be amended, the competent authority should, no later than three (3) months after 
the end of the innovative experimentation, complete an amendment draft of the financial laws and submit the draft to the Executive Yuan for review. 
• According to this report and this FSC announcement, Taiwan’s first experiment will be a collaboration between KGI Bank and Chunghwa Telecom in, 
effectively, the retail payment systems space. The idea is to offer loan and credit lines based on credit scores calculated from payment records of telecom fees 
using big data analysis. Identity of the user would be verified by checking the IP address of the borrower’s mobile phone. It seems that Chunghwa Telecom is 
responsible for providing relevant and accurate user data to KGI, allowing KGI to perform its big data analysis, which decides the amount of loan and credit 
lines.  
• Taiwan passed regulations under the Experimentation Act in July 2018, “for the purposes of providing a friendly environment for financial technology 
development and encouraging the use of technology to develop innovative financial products and services,” and empowering the FSC to, inter alia, “amend 
financial regulations as deemed fit to facilitate financial innovation,” provide funding, encourage strategic cooperation between financial institutions and those 
using “innovative technology”, encourage financial institutions to use fintech in business development and transformation, and the like. FSC is to establish a 
dedicated fintech unit, effectively an innovation accelerator/sandbox 
Internet Only Banks 
The Executive Yuan announced a Financial Development Action Plan in June 2018, which proposes changing to banking regulation not really relevant here – around 
funding for select industries, residential construction. However, does say “more incentives are provided for financial holding companies to merge with other financial 
institutions, internet-only banks are allowed to be established, and financial institutions are encouraged for innovation, in order to increase competitiveness of domestic 
financial institutions.” 
Policy Announcement re internet only bank establishment, June 2018: same scope of business as commercial bank, with cap on two licenses at first. At least one of the 
internet bank’s founders must be a bank or financial holding company with intention to achieve majority shareholding status in internet bank. Supervision, capital, fit 
and proper requirements apply. 
Act Governing Electronic Payment Institutions (EPI Act) (2015)  
Article 3 : “electronic payment institution” defined as “a company approved by the [FSC] to accept, through a network or electronic payment platform, the registration 
and opening of an account by users that keeps track of their funds transfer and funds deposit records (referred to as "e-payment account" hereunder), and use electronic 
equipment to convey the receipt/payment information via connection to engage in the following businesses in the capacity of an intermediary between payers and 
recipients, excluding companies that engage only in business under the first subparagraph below and where the total balance of funds collected/paid and kept by them as 





1. Collecting and making payments for real transactions as an agent. 
2. Accepting deposits of funds as stored value funds. 
3. Transferring funds between e-payment accounts. 
4. Other businesses approved by the competent authority. 
This article describes the expansion of mobile money and e-commerce in Taiwan, while noting that many Taiwanese residents are still committed to cash or other 





The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has adopted a pro-finance, pro-innovation stance. Its regulatory structure is substantially different to Canada’s, and 
similar to Australia’s: both have “twin peaks” regulators. The banking industry in the UK is undergoing radical change, particularly around 
the Open Banking initiative. Brexit has introduced substantial uncertainty, as well, though as of this date the UK has been subject to, and has 
operated in line with, important EU provisions such as the Banking Directive 1, the Payment Services Directive 2, and others. 
 
UK 
Banking Licenses: PRA and FCA have jointly established “new bank start-up unit116” and “new insurer start-up unit117” but no entry-level or restricted 
bank/insurer licenses available. Rules seem to be the same as they ever were 
List118 from May 2018 of “challenger banks,” virtually all digital with a range of business plans, which are at some stage of applying for banking licenses 
Open Banking (UK’s version of PSD2, with some specific elements) 
Openbanking.org.uk 
• Non-profit Open Banking Limited, established by Competition and Markets Authority in response to longstanding concerns about poor customer 
outcomes, will run it. Became effective 13 Jan 2018 
• Uses open APIs 
• UK’s nine largest banks must comply: HSBC, Barclays, RBS, Santander, Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Bank, Danske, Lloyds and Nationwide 
• FinTech companies apply to FCA to be accepted as approved third parties (“regulated providers119”) in order to access APIs. Currently approved TPs 
seem to be mix of bank-owned operations and startups.  
• Focus on mobile banking, money management and financial visibility, payments (allowing customers to pay directly from bank, circumventing credit 
cards and other middlemen), increasing competition in lending markets, reliance on trusted APIs and trusted third parties 
• Customer maintains control over information sharing  
Non-traditional credit access for SMEs: November 2016 Bank Referral Scheme:  
                                               
116 Bank of England, “New Bank Start-up Unit” (2019), online: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/prudential-regulation/new-bank-start-up-unit>. 
117 Bank of England, “New Insurer Start-up Unit What you need to know from the PRA and the FCA” (2018), online: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/new-insurer/new-insurer-start-up-unit-guide.pdf?la=en&hash=310E7B09C241113F97CDDCC36F339DAF90911057>. 
118 Tanya Andreasyan, “UK challenger banks: who’s who (and what’s their tech)” (2018), online: <www.bankingtech.com/2018/05/uk-challenger-banks-whos-who-and-
whats-their-tech/>.  




“the scheme requires 9 of the UK’s biggest banks to pass on the details of small businesses they have turned down for finance to three Government designated 
finance platforms: Alternative Business Funding, Funding Options and Funding Xchange. These platforms are, in turn, required to share their details, in 
anonymous form, with alternative finance providers, helping to facilitate a conversation between the business and any provider who expresses an interest in 
supplying finance to them. … The scheme was introduced in response to evidence which shows that SMEs tend to approach their main bank when seeking 
finance and that, if rejected, many simply give up rather than seek alternative options. As other finance providers with different business models or risk appetites 
may be more willing to lend to these SMEs, this represents both an informational market failure and a significant barrier to entry for competitors in the SME 
lending market.” Acceptance rate is about 10% 
Other UK support for fintech coordination with incumbent banks 
British Standards Institution, Fintech Delivery Panel (November 2018, supported by HM Treasury), Publicly Available Specification120 provides guidance on 
supporting fintechs in engaging with financial institutions 
“This … provides a guide to fintechs on the terms and approach used by many financial institutions for collaboration and commercialisation of new 
fintech propositions. It forms part of a wider body of work, referred to within the HM Treasury, Fintech Sector Strategy (March 2018), to develop a set 
of industry standards that will support fintech firms by providing them with a consistent understanding of what financial institutions will need from 
them before entering into partnership arrangements. … Its intention is to provide a framework that will allow fintechs to better prepare for and confirm 
that they are ready to engage with a large financial institution. It provides an explanation of both the commercial considerations and the necessary 
checks and controls that need to be satisfied to meet business and regulatory demands.” 
Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (under FCA) and Payment Services Regulations (under FCA): Description of combined effect here121  (December 2018) 
                                               
120 The British Standards Institution, Supporting fintechs in engaging with financial institutions – Guide, PAS 201:2018 (London: BSI Standards Limited, 2018) at 1.  





• Payment Systems Regulator122, subsidiary of FCA, with competition orientation and responsibility for oversight of retail payment systems (including 
Bacs123 (retail), CHAPs124 (large value and wholesale), Visa and Mastercard) became fully operational on 1 April 2015. Mid-2018, announced market 
review125 into competitiveness around credit cards, particularly perception that merchants are being disadvantaged by anticompetitive behaviour. 
• July 2017: new policy126 to allow non-bank payment service providers direct access to RTGS settlement system (as with TIPS in EU) 
 
  
                                               
122 Payment Systems Regulator, “Homepage”, (2019), online: <www.psr.org.uk>. 
123 Bacs, now owned by Pay.UK (online: www.bacs.co.uk/About/Pages/CorporateOverview.aspx), has been the company that runs Direct Debit in the UK. It also runs 
the Bacs Direct Credit Scheme, which is used to pay salaries and settle invoices from suppliers; and the Current Account Switch Service, which allows personal and 
business customers to switch banks easily. January 2018 commentary (online: www.finextra.com/blogposting/14947/what-does-open-banking-mean-for-direct-debit---
and-how-does-it-tie-in-to-star-wars) on what Open Banking (a “push” system) means for Direct Debit (a “pull” system). Several new participants have joined Bacs in 
recent years including first non-bank payment service provider (online: 
www.bacs.co.uk/NewsCentre/PressReleases/Pages/IpagooFirstNonBankPaymentServiceProviderToJoinBacs.aspx), in May 2018. Bacs services were consolidated with 
other main retail payment systems in 2018, under Pay.uk (which was briefly called the New Payments System Operator) to create a more efficient, unified retail payment 
system dubbed the “New Payments Architecture”. 
124 CHAPS (Clearing House Automated Payment System, online: www.bankofengland.co.uk/payment-and-settlement/chaps) is sterling same-day system that is used to 
settle high-value wholesale payments as well as time-critical, lower-value payments like buying or paying a deposit on a property. Direct participants in CHAPS include 
the traditional high-street banks and a number of international and custody banks. Many more financial institutions access the system indirectly and make their payments 
via direct participants. This is known as agency or correspondent banking. CHAPS payments have several main uses: (1) Financial institutions and some of the largest 
businesses use CHAPS to settle money market and foreign exchange transactions (2) Corporates use CHAPS for high value and time-sensitive payments such as to 
suppliers or for payment of taxes (3) CHAPS is commonly used by solicitors and conveyancers to complete housing and other property transactions (4) Individuals may 
use CHAPS to buy high-value items such as a car or pay a deposit for a house. CHAPS represents 0.5% of UK total payment volumes but 93% of total sterling payment 
values (excluding internalised flows within payment service providers). 
125 Steward Plant & Philip Williams, “Payment Systems Regulator announces market review” (2018), online: DLA Piper 
<www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2018/08/payment-systems-regulator/>. 




The United States 
The United States (federal level only) has entity-based regulation, as does Canada, with a distinction between banking, securities and 
investment banking, and insurance. Banking regulation at the federal level is fractured, and each of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC), the Treasury (and the Financial Stability Oversight Council, FSOC, which it chairs) and the Federal Depository 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are engaged in core banking regulatory matters. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) also has 
a mandate over financial protection matters. Activity also takes place at the state level. In particular, state regulators can create Industrial 
Loan Companies (ILCs), which the FDIC’s new chair has recently suggested could be a vehicle for spurring innovation. A state banking 
regulatory umbrella body recently asserted that they are “the primary regulators of nonbank and fintech firms.” The FSB has critiqued the 
fragmented regulatory situation in the US, which also exists vertically between national and state regulators: US127 (2013). State level 
regulation is not covered in this report.  
 
US 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), matters “incidental” to banking, and new special purpose bank charter: 
• OCC is primary regulator for national bank; an independent bureau within Treasury. Supervises national banks (and others). Regulates credit cards issued 
by national banks. Comptroller serves as director of FDIC and member of FSOC 
• Has established a Responsible Innovation128 Office, which has developed “special purpose national bank charters”129 for fintech firms 
(considering applications from 31 July 2018), Per the press release:  
o “The OCC will consider applications from fintech companies to charter a special purpose national bank that would engage in one or more of the 
“core banking activities” of paying checks or lending money but would not take deposits and would not be insured by the FDIC. The OCC stated 
that a qualified fintech company that receives a special purpose national bank charter will be subject to the same high standards of safety and 
soundness and fairness that all federally chartered banks must meet, and will be supervised like similarly situated national banks, including with 
respect to capital, liquidity, and risk management. …  
§ Every application will be evaluated on its unique facts and circumstances. 
§ Fintech companies that apply and qualify for, and receive, special purpose national bank charters will be supervised like similarly 
situated national banks, to include capital, liquidity, and financial inclusion commitments as appropriate. Fintech companies will be 
expected to submit an acceptable contingency plan to address significant financial stress that could threaten the viability of the bank. 
                                               
127 Financial Stability Board, Peer Review of the United States, (Financial Stability Board, 2013).  
128 U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Responsible Innovation”, online: <www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/index-innovation.html>. 
129 U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, News Release, “OCC Begins Accepting National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies”, 





The plan would outline strategies for restoring the bank's financial strength and options for selling, merging, or liquidating the bank in 
the event the recovery strategies are not effective. 
§ The expectations for promoting financial inclusion will depend on the company's business model and the types of planned products, 
services, and activities. 
§ New fintech companies that become special purpose national banks will be subject to heightened supervision initially, similar to other 
de novo banks. 
o The OCC has the authority, expertise, processes, procedures, and resources necessary to supervise fintech companies that become national banks 
and to unwind a fintech company that becomes a national bank in the event that it fails. 
Industrial Loan Companies (ILCs) and Innovation at the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC): 
• FDIC is concurrent regulator for national banks (in regard to depository insurance), primary federal regulator for state banks (whose deposits they also 
insure). Virtually all commercial banks in US must be insured by FDIC 
• July 2018 announcement re FDIC setting up an “office of innovation” to encourage banks to adopt fintech strategies (presumably with primary eye on 
smaller banks with fewer resources, as main audience) 
• Per new Chair Jelena McWilliams, October 2018130, “FDIC could encourage innovation in three ways: The first is through the industrial loan company, a 
specialized banking charter supervised by the FDIC; the second way would be through the FDIC’s regulation of banks’ third-party vendor relationships; 
and the third is by working with tech companies to obtain improved processing, service and efficiency at banks”  
o April 2016131, re-reduced “heightened scrutiny” period and higher capital requirement for new institutions from 7 years to 3 years (rescinding a 
change made in 2009 to increase the time period from 3 to 7 years) 
• Industrial Loan Companies (ILCs): 
o Controversial: a bank charter that allows companies to own a bank w/o having to comply with Bank Holding Company Act requirements. 
Undated (circa 2004) summary on FDIC website here132  
o Have access to depository insurance, hence FDIC oversight. Capitalization, arms-length conditions, etc. still apply.  
o Available in 9 states, with Utah being the dominant one 
                                               
130 Haggerty, “FDIC to launch innovation office”, supra note 53.  
131 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Press Release, “FDIC Rescinds De Novo Time Period Extension; Releases Supplemental Guidance on Business Planning” (6 
April 2016), online: <www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2016/pr16027.html>. 






o Apparently of interest to fintechs that want to offer fuller range of services including taking deposits: student online lender SoFi133 applied then 
withdrew application, 2017; Square applied then withdrew, but claims continued intention to become ILC in Utah. 
Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB): 
• Consumer protection mandate, including over credit cards not regulated by OCC 
§ Proposed “disclosure sandbox134” to test new communication ideas w customers (Sept 2018) 
Reports of Note 
The Federal Reserve  
• Central bank, lender of last resort (for national banks overseen by OCC). The Fed must approve acquisitions of banks, and banks’ acquisitions of other 
banks and approved non-bank subs. The Fed is not a banking regulator per se, except with regard to supervising designated SIFIs per FSOC 
• Has established FedPaymentsImprovement135 initiative, which has launched  
o Faster Payments Task Force136 (2017). Among other things, an outcome was for the Fed to allow joint access to Fed accounts by multiple 
parties (e.g., a mainstream bank and a payment service provider); issues of speed, interoperability, accessibility, other challenges remain. (Also a 
Secure Payments Task Force137)  
o Next Steps138 document (2017) sets agenda for future work around 5 topics: speed, security, efficiency, international (meaning cross-border 
payments), and collaboration (with stakeholders in the US) 
Treasury 
• Fintech Report139 July 2018 – see Appendix B @ p. 197 for Table of Recommendations, summarized in: “opportunities to modernize regulation to 
embrace the use of data, encourage the adoption of advanced data processing and other techniques to improve business processes, and support the launch 
                                               
133 Harris, “Are you ready to ditch your bank?”, supra note 54.  
134 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “CFPB Office of Innovation proposes “disclosure sandbox” for companies to test new ways to inform consumers” (13 
September 2018), Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Blog), online: <www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/cfpb-office-innovation-proposes-disclosure-
sandbox-companies-test-new-ways-inform-consumers/>. 
135 Federal Reserve Banks, “Homepage”, online: <fedpaymentsimprovement.org>. 
136 Faster Payments Task Force, “The U.S. Path to Faster Payments”, online: <fasterpaymentstaskforce.org>. 
137 Secure Payments Task Force, “Homepage”, online: <securepaymentstaskforce.org>. 
138 Federal Reserve System, “Strategies for Improving the U.S. Payment System Federal Reserve Next Steps in the Payments Improvement Journey”, (Washington: 
2017).  





of alternative product and service delivery systems. Support of innovation is critical across the regulatory system — both at the federal and state levels. 
Treasury supports encouraging the launch of new business models as well as enabling traditional financial institutions, such as banks, asset managers, and 
insurance companies, to pursue innovative technologies to lower costs, improve customer outcomes, and improve access to credit and other services.  … 
Treasury’s recommendations in this report can be summarized in the following four categories: 
o Adapting regulatory approaches to changes in the aggregation, sharing, and use of consumer financial data, and to support the development of 
key competitive technologies; 
o Aligning the regulatory framework to combat unnecessary regulatory fragmentation, and account for new business models enabled by financial 
technologies; 
o Updating activity-specific regulations across a range of products and services offered by nonbank financial institutions, many of which have 
become outdated in light of technological advances; and 
o Advocating an approach to regulation that enables responsible experimentation in the financial sector, improves regulatory agility, and advances 
American interests abroad. 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)  
• Systemic stability mandate, chaired by Treasury 
• Annual Report 2018140  discusses New Financial Products and Services starting at p. 87 – really just a watching brief. 
o Has established Digital Assets Working Group 
o Discuss P2P payments and marketplace lending (in which “model has evolved to one that uses significant capital from institutional investors to 
finance consumer and small business loans”); acknowledge potential entry of large tech firms into financial space; acknowledge potential risks 
of financial institutions relying on TPPs for operational functions and data gathering, including on the cloud 
Payment systems 
More research can be done if needed, but note that at the retail level: 
o The OCC regulates credit cards issued by federal banks 
o e.g., PayPal is regulated as “money transmitter” on state-by-state basis 
                                               





o June 2018: SCOTUS ruled, in Sherman Antitrust matter brought by DoJ against AmEx in Ohio v American Express, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), 141 that 
merchants could not suggest to customers that bring out AmEx cards that they use another method of payment. More research required to understand 
broader impact on hopes for open banking in US.  
State regulators now asserting a role as “the primary regulators of nonbank and fintech firms”. State banks are not part of Federal Reserve system 
Certain states (e.g., Arizona) have begun to try to become hubs of fintech activity through more flexible licensing regimes. This may have been the catalyst for 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) Vision 2020:142 plan is that by 2020, “state regulators will adopt an integrated, 50-state licensing and supervisory 
system, leveraging technology and smart regulatory policy to transform the interaction between industry, regulators and consumers.” 
• Oppose143 OCC special purpose bank charters above 
• Has established “Fintech Industry Advisory Panel” to provide” industry input to help states: modernize regulatory regimes; identify points of friction in 
licensing and multi-state regulation; and discuss a wide array of solutions.  The panel will focus on payments and money transmission; lending; and 
community banks and innovation.” 
Aims to develop a “Redesigned Nationwide Multistate Licensing System (NMLS) - the common platform for state regulation - will transform the licensing 
process thru data/analytics; automate most new applicants; and enable states to focus more on higher-risk cases while streamlining state regulation on a multi-state 
basis.” 
                                               
141 Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Sides with American Express on Merchant Fees”, New York Times (25 June 2018), online: 
<www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/politics/supreme-court-american-express-fees.html>.  
142 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, “Vision 2020 for Fintech and Non-Bank Regulation”, online: <www.csbs.org/vision2020>. 
143 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, “The OCC Fintech Charter”, online: <www.csbs.org/occ-fintech-charter>. 
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